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(

JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

(

§ 78A-4-104(2)G).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in ruling on summary judgment that the Right of

Way Contract was unambiguous and did not obligate UDOT to construct a frontage road
to benefit Hillcrest's property even though the contract incorporates warranty deeds that

^

convey property to UDOT "for a frontage road"?
A.

Standard of Review. A district court's "legal conclusions and

ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment" are reviewed for correctness, viewing the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Hoyer v. State of Utah, 2009 UT 38, | 7, 212 P.3d 547. The

(

correctness standard of review applies regardless of the nature of the underlying law
governing the parties' rights. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ^ 16, 250 P.3d 56.
B.

(

Preservation of Issue. This issue was preserved at R. 827-831, 837-

843, 855-860, 930-931, and 967 at27:15-34:15.1
C

2.

Did the district court err on summary judgment by not viewing Hillcrest's

evidence on standing in the light most favorable to Hillcrest and instead by weighing the
"sufficiency" of Hillcrest's evidence in ruling that Hillcrest lacked standing to sue UDOT

(

under the Right of Way Contract?
1

The entire transcript of the oral argument has been numbered as Record No. 967.
Hillcrest has therefore included the page and line number within that transcript in its
citations.

(

1
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A.

Standard of Review. A district court's "legal conclusions and

ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment" are reviewed for correctness, viewing the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Hoyer v. State of Utah, 2009 UT 38, \ 7, 212 P.3d 547. The
correctness standard of review applies regardless of the nature of the underlying law
governing the parties' rights. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, If 16, 250 P.3d 56.
B.

Preservation of Issue. This issue was preserved at R. 826, 835-837,

921-923, 924-926, 930-931, and 967 at 21:12-26:24.
3.

Did the district court err in ruling on summary judgment that UDOT was

not unjustly enriched by Hillcrest and its predecessors when UDOT failed to construct
the frontage road it promised as a benefit to the remaining property?
A.

Standard of Review. A district court's "legal conclusions and

ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment" are reviewed for correctness, viewing the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Hoyer v. State of Utah, 2009 UT 38, f 7, 212 P.3d 547. The
correctness standard of review applies regardless of the nature of the underlying law
governing the parties' rights. Bahr v. Imus, 2011 UT 19, ^f 16, 250 P.3d 56.
B.

Preservation of Issue. This issue was preserved at R. 848-854, 967

at 34:16-38:19.

2
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c
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I

Hillcrest Investment Company L.L.C. ("Hillcrest") sued the Utah Department of
Transportation ("UDOT") in the Third District Court for breach of the UDOT Right of
(

Way Contract (the "Right of Way Contract" or the "Contract"), unjust enrichment, and a
declaratory judgment that UDOT was contractually bound to construct a frontage road,
and for an order of specific performance. (R. 7-11,16.)
UDOT moved for summary judgment on all claims. (R. 164-231.) UDOT asserted
that Hillcrest lacked privity of contract and therefore did not have standing to enforce the
Contract. (R. 170.) UDOT also argued that it was not contractually obligated to construct
a frontage road. (R. 171-172.) UDOT's memorandum did not provide the district court
(

with a statement of undisputed facts on summary judgment. (R. 167-170.) Hillcrest
opposed summary judgment, identifying fact disputes and arguing that it was an assignee
of and a successor to the contracting party with standing to enforce the Contract, that

(

UDOT had a contractual obligation to build the frontage road, and that UDOT had been
unjustly enriched. (R. 835-842.) Oral arguments on the Motion for Summary Judgment

r
were held on December 27, 2010. (R. 967.)
The Third District Court granted UDOT's motion for summary judgment on all
counts. (R. 919-933.) The Final Ruling and Order was issued on March 7, 20112. (R.

^

919-933.) Hillcrest appeals this Ruling and Order. (R. 934-935.)
(
2

The district court's ruling is attached as Addendum 1.
3
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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

The Property and Development Plans,

The Horman family owned approximately 143 acres of property located west of
Interstate 15 in CenterviUe, Utah (the "Property"). (R. 450:18-452:25.)3 Title to the
Property was held by four trusts established for the benefit of various members of the
Horman family. (R. 404-413, 415, 417-441, 451:1-24.) The trusts were (1) the Namroh
Trust, (2) the Theodore and Birdie Horman Family Trust, (3) the SCV Family Trust, and
(4) the Phares T. Horman Family Trust (collectively, the "Horman Trusts") (R. 404-413,
415, 417-441, 451:1-24.)
Approximately 58.3 acres of the Property consisted of wetlands. (R. 315.)
Nevertheless, the Property was the largest parcel of property in CenterviUe still available
for commercial development. (R. 238-239.) The Horman Trusts planned to build a
business park on the Property. (R. 233,fflj2-3.) They invested significant resources into
the development. (R. 238-239, 250.) The City of CenterviUe approved of the Horman
Trusts' plans and rezoned the Property for commercial development. (R. 238, 239.)
B,

Condemnation of the Property,
1.

UDOT announces plans for the Legacy Highway and a frontage
road.

In the late 1990s, UDOT announced plans to construct the Legacy Parkway across
the eastern edge of the Property. (R. 689-691, 713-717, 826-827.) In response, the

3

Record pages that contain line numbers, such as deposition transcripts, will be
indicated by: Record Page : Line Number.
4
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(

Horman Trusts notified UDOT that they planned to develop the Property into a
business park, that the Property had been rezoned for commercial development, that a
development plan had been created for the Property, and that the Property was the largest
undeveloped parcel in Centerville suitable for commercial development. (R. 238-239,

/

250.)
UDOT represented to the City of Centerville that it planned to construct a frontage
(

road to allow the development of the Property to go forward. (R. 713-714.) In
correspondence with UDOT, Centerville reiterated to UDOT that it was counting on
UDOT to build the frontage road. (R. 689.) UDOT responded to Mayor Hirschi stating,

(

UDOT proposes to provide a frontage road that would
parallel the Legacy Parkway and would be within the UDOT
right-of-way. This proposed frontage road would start on the
south end directly east of existing 1250 West and parallel the
Legacy Parkway to a point on the north end directly east of
the existing 650 West.

(

(R. 713-714.) The Horman Trusts were aware of these representations, and relied upon
them. Letter from Kevin R. Murray to John Thomas. (R. 727.)
2.

UDOT's appraisal reaffirms its commitment to build a frontage road.

UDOT asked the Horman Trusts for permission to conduct an appraisal of the

^

Property in August 2000. (R. 466:7-25.) The Horman Trusts agreed. (R. 693, 695.)
UDOT hired David Van Drimmelen to conduct the appraisal. (R. 247-371,

f

467:10-22.) Mr. Van Drimmelen's appraisal report (the "UDOT Appraisal") divided the
portion of the Property that UDOT proposed to take into four Parcels: 0067:173,
0067:173:A, 0067:173:C, and 0067:173:E (collectively, the "Condemned Property"). (R.

5
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(

249-250.) The numbers assigned to each parcel were not legal descriptions. Rather,
these were internal numbers UDOT assigned to parcels of land to be condemned. (R.
480:9-14.) The number 0067 in the Parcel Number referred to the Legacy Highway
project. (R. 481:14-16.) "173" in the parcel number referred to the Property owned by
the Horman family. (R. 481:17-18.) And the letters referred to a particular parcel of the
Property. (R. 481:19-482:1.)
The parcel in dispute was assigned the number 0067:173:C. This parcel was
conveyed under four deeds, one from each of the trusts—0067:173 :C, 0067:173:C1,
0067:173:C2; and 0067:173:C3 (collectively, "Parcel C"). (R. 350-357.) The UDOT
Appraisal acknowledged that Parcel C would be used for a frontage road, and attached
several draft warranty deeds for Parcels 0067:173:C, 0067:173:C1, 0067:173:C2, and
0067:173:C3. (R. 350-357.) Each deed states that it is conveying "the following
described parcel of land in Davis County, State of Utah, to-wit: An undivided . . . interest
in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway
known as Project No. 0067

" (R. 350-357.) The UDOT appraiser also attached to

his report a "Project Strip Map." (R. 368-369.) That map indicates the location of the
promised frontage road under the designation "FRTG. RD R/W LINE." (R. 369.) This
road runs through all of Parcel C. (R. 369.)
The UDOT Appraisal confirmed that UDOT was going to build a frontage road
and it assessed the damage to the remainder of the Property (the "Remainder Property")
that would be caused by UDOT's taking:

6
S\C
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(

Furthermore, UDOT is going to build a frontage road on the
west side of the proposed highway that will traverse the
subject property from the north to the south property lines.
There will be access to that frontage road in the after
condition. Therefore, since UDOT is going to install the
roadway, at it's [sic] expense, and the subject property would
benefit from that roadway installation, the subject property
has a special benefit from the roadway widening project.
That benefit will be vastly superior access to the subject
property than currently exists. Once that access is established,
development could occur on the upland portions of the
subject property.

v

(

(R. 320.) Because UDOT would build the frontage road at its expense, supplying
the benefit of "vastly superior access," the UDOT appraiser concluded that UDOT did
not need to provide "additional compensation" to the Horman Trusts for damages caused

(

to the Remainder Property. (R. 320.) Dave Evans had discussions with Mr. Van
Drimmelen on behalf of the Horman Trusts during the appraisal process. (R. 514-515.)

<

During these discussions, Mr. Van Drimmelen told Mr. Evans that the appraisal was
based on UDOT's commitment to construct the frontage road and that the value of the
(

Remainder Property would be enhanced by the frontage road. (R. 514-515.)
The appraiser reiterated his conclusion that UDOT did not need to compensate the
Horman Trusts for damages to the Remainder Property in the document entitled
"Summary of Values," which was included in the UDOT Appraisal. (R. 321.) The
"Summary of Values" designated the amount of compensation the appraiser concluded
should be paid for each aspect of the taking. (R. 321.) The appraiser concluded that the
total value of "Severance Damages" was $0. (R. 321.) In total, the appraiser concluded
that UDOT should pay the Horman Trusts $1.27 Million for the taking. (R. 321 -322.)

7
S T T Q11QR8 4

-

The Horman Trusts received a copy of the UDOT Appraisal. (R. 45 5:13 -16.)
UDOT understood that the Horman Trusts, as the owners of the Property, would rely on
the UDOT Appraisal and believe the contents of that report were truthful. (R. 468:3-24.)
UDOT conceded on summary judgment that "[a"]t the time of the purchase, UDOT
planned that a frontage road and recreation trail would be built on a portion of the land
acquired." (R. 168 (emphasis supplied).)
3.

UDOT commences the condemnation action.

UDOT commenced a condemnation action against the Horman Trusts in
September, 2001. (R. 373-390.) UDOT's complaint (the "Condemnation Complaint")
declared: "The location, route, and termini of the highway project and related
improvements upon and across the property of the Defendants are correctly shown on
these Exhibits." (R. 377, f 7.)
Exhibit A to the Condemnation Complaint was UDOT's condemnation resolution.
(R. 379-387.) That resolution describes the property that was subject to the
condemnation action. The description for parcel No. 0067:173 :C states, "A parcel of
land in fee for a frontage road incident to the construction of afreewayknown as Project
No. 0067 . . . . " (R. 384 (emphasis supplied).); (R. 471:1-14.) Hillcrest deposed UDOT's
Todd Jensen about the condemnation resolution. (R. 470-471.) Mr. Jensen testified that
Parcel C "was to be acquired by UDOT for the purpose of construction of a frontage road
. . . incident to the construction of a freeway." (R. 470:22-471:6.) He further testified that
the frontage road was "the sole public purpose justifying the condemnation" of Parcel C.
(R. 471:10-14.)
r
SLC 911988.4
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(

Exhibit B to UDOT's Condemnation Complaint included two maps relating to the
Legacy Highway Project. (R. 377, f 7.) The map attached as the third page of Exhibit B
contains a line with the designation "FRONTAGE ROAD AND RECREATION
TRAIL." (R. 390 at HILL 0934.)4
4.

(

Negotiations between UDOT and the Horman Trusts.

UDOT and the Horman Trusts attempted to negotiate a settlement of UDOT's
acquisition of the Condemned Property both before and after UDOT commenced the
condemnation action. (R. 233-235, 829.) UDOT's David West spoke to Loyal Hulme,
the attorney for the Horman Trusts. (R. 495:7-17.) During these negotiations, Mr. West

(

and Mr. Hulme discussed that a frontage road "was going to be constructed along the east
boundary of the remainder by UDOT." (R. 495:7-17.) The frontage road was to run
north "approximately a thousand some-odd feet." (R. 495:17-20.)
UDOT then sent the Horman Trusts an offer to purchase part of the Horman
Property for $45,000 per acre (the "Offer Letter"). (R. 392-394, 473:1-12.) UDOT

(

attached a map to the Offer Letter, and marked the frontage road on Parcel C. (R. 394.)
In addition, UDOT attached to the Offer Letter the"Summary of Values" from the
UDOT Appraisal, which designated the specific compensation to be paid to Hillcrest for
various aspects of the condemnation. (R. 393.) Although UDOT had made handwritten
(
4

UDOT filed two maps with Exhibit B to its complaint in the condemnation
proceeding. Both maps have been included in the record, but only the first map was
assigned a page number. The page number for the first map is R. 390. The map showing
the frontage road immediately follows that map and bears the Bates Number HILL 0934.
A copy of this map has been attached as Addendum 2. The Frontage Road has been
highlighted for the Court's convenience.

(•

9
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changes to some of the values assigned by the appraiser, the value to be paid by UDOT to
the Horman Trusts for "Severance Damages" to the Remainder Property remained $0, as
in the UDOT Appraisal. (R. 393, 492:6-493:9.) The total to be paid to the Horman
Trusts by UDOT under the Offer Letter was $1,958,430.00. (R. 393.) The Horman
Trusts accepted this offer. (R. 396.)
5.

The Contract.

UDOT and the trustees of the Horman Trusts executed a Right of Way Contract
(the "Contract" or the "Right of Way Contract")5 in January 2002. (R. 415.) As noted
above, at the time the Contract was executed, UDOT "planned that a frontage road and
recreation trail would be built on a portion of the land acquired." (R. 168.) The Right of
Way Contract provides that UDOT will "[p]ay cash in full" to the Horman Trusts "for the
following: Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:A; Land as described in
Warranty Deed No. 0067:173; Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:C."
(R. 415.) The Right of Way Contract contains no other description of the property
conveyed to UDOT. (R. 415.) It is impossible to identify the legal description of the
land conveyed unless the warranty deeds are read in conjunction with the Right of Way
Contract. (R. 480:9-22.)
UDOT and the Horman Trusts executed a group of warranty deeds in connection
with this conveyance several weeks later. (R. 417-440.) The "Land as described in"
Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:C is:

5

The Right of Way Contract is attached as Addendum 3.
10
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thefollowingdescribed parcel of land in Davis County, Utah,
to-wit:
(

An undivided 23.445410% interest in a parcel of land in fee
for a frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway
known as Project No. 0067, being part of an entire tract of
property....
(R. 423) (emphasis supplied). Warranty deeds 0067:173:C1; 0067:173:C2; and
0067:173 :C36 contain identical language except for the percentage of the interest being
conveyed by each of the Horman Trusts. (R. 429, 435, 417.) The Horman Trusts and
UDOT had access to unexecuted copies of the warranty deeds prior to the execution of
the Right of Way Contract, as they were attached to the UDOT Appraisal. (R. 334-357.)
And a copy of a warranty deed for Parcel C was sent by UDOT to the Horman Trusts'
attorney in December 2001. (R. 399-402.) On summary judgment, UDOT admitted that
t

the "deeds do contain a statement of the intended purpose of the purchase . . . ." (R. 171.)
The warranty deeds for Parcels 173 and 173 A contain similar language, but
identify a separate purpose for the land. Deeds for Parcel 173 state that the parcel is "for

(

a Utility Corridor," and deeds for Parcel 173:A state that it is "for a freeway known as
Project No. 0067." (R. 419, 421, 425, 431, 433, 437, 439.)
C
David Evans, the property manager and the manager of a beneficiary of the SCV
Family Trust, was involved in the negotiations of the Right of Way Contract on behalf of
the Horman Trusts and helped gather the trustees' signatures on the Right of Way
Contract and warranty deeds. (R. 450:5-14, 452:15-18, 454:14-17.) At the time Mr.
Evans approved the Right of Way Contract for the trustees' signature, it was his
6

The Warranty Deeds for Parcel C are attached as Addendum 4.
11
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(

understanding that "the deeds were part of that contract." (R. 456:23-457:9.) UDOT's
Todd Jensen testified that it is necessary to look to the warranty deeds to identify the land
being conveyed and that the Right of Way Contract incorporates the warranty deeds. (R.
480:15-22.)
The Right of Way Contract also contains language that contemplates that UDOT
will improve the Condemned Property, stating "[a]ll work done under this agreement,
shall conform to all applicable building, fire and sanitary laws, ordinances and
regulations relating to such work, and shall be done in a good and workmanlike manner."
(R.415.)
III.

THE HORMAN TRUSTS MAKE AN ASSIGNMENT TO HILLCREST.
In late 2005 and early 2006, the Horman Trusts conveyed their remaining property

to Hillcrest. (R. 452:19-453:7.) To accomplish this, the Horman Trusts and Hillcrest
executed a Real Estate Purchase Contract (the "REPC"). (R. 719-724.)
The REPC describes the property to be conveyed to Hillcrest as "all real estate
owned by the [the Horman Trusts] which, to the best of Seller's knowledge and belief,
comprises all of the real estate, water rights, water shares and property rights owned by
Seller (the "Property") described on Exhibit A." (R. 720.) This property was located in
Utah, Nevada, and Kentucky.7 (R. 720.) The REPC acknowledges that the Horman
Trusts may hold property rights of which they were not aware at the time of contracting.
Accordingly, it states, "the Property shall also include all real estate, water rights, water
7

The district court apparently believed that the property conveyed under the
REPC only consisted of the Remainder Property adjacent to the parcels previously sold in
Utah to UDOT. (R. 923 at paragraphs 12-13).
12
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shares and property rights which may be later discovered to be owned by the Seller at the
time of the execution of this Purchase Contract but was inadvertently left off the property
itemized on Exhibit A." (R. 720.)
The REPC acknowledges that its execution was part of an effort to liquidate all the

r

assets of the Horman Trusts. (R. 720.) For example, the REPC states,
Seller comprises four successor liquidating trusts originated
from the Horman Family Trust formulated in 1979 for the
purpose of converting all of the assets of the Horman Family
Trust to cash and disbursing the resultant proceeds to the
Horman Family Trust Beneficiaries as soon as prudently
feasible.

(

(R. 719.)
The REPC further acknowledges Hillcrest's relation to the Horman Trusts, stating
Whereas Buyer is a related party of the Seller and has
committed to purchase the Property under the terms contained
in the Purchase Contract as an accommodation to facilitate
Seller's desire to convert all remaining real estate assets to
cash and disburse said cash to the beneficiaries of Seller.

(

(

(R. 719.)
Hillcrest and the sellers were related parties because Hillcrest was a beneficiary of
the SCV Family Trust, one of the four Horman Trusts. (R. 451:9-24, 520.) The SCV

(

Family Trust (the "SCV Trust") was established for the benefit of Sidney M. Horman Jr.
and his descendants. (R. 451:9-10.) Charles Horman, one of the descendants, was the
C
trustee of the SCV Trust and executed the Right of Way Contract and REPC on its
behalf. (R. 415, 722-723.) Charles Horman is also the managing member of Hillcrest.
(R. 452:9-12.) His wife and children are the other members of Hillcrest. (R. 451:21-24.)

(

-
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Their beneficial interest in the SCV Trust was held entirely through Hillcrest.
(R. 451:19-20.)
The REPC was eventually followed by a deed from the Horman Trusts to
Hillcrest. (R. 454:1-13.) Hillcrest is now the sole owner of the Remainder Property and
all related property rights. (R. 453:2-7.) UDOT did not dispute this evidence, and even
admitted that Hillcrest is the Horman Trusts'"successor in interest.'' (R. 167.) Evidence
was produced indicating that following the conveyance of the Property to Hillcrest, the
Horman Trusts were liquidated. (R. 452:19-453:7.)
UDOT had not built the frontage road at the time of the conveyance from the
Horman Trusts to Hillcrest. At that time, neither Hillcrest nor the Horman Trusts knew
that UDOT would refuse to construct the frontage road. (R. 967 at 44:1-8.)
IV,

UDOT REFUSES TO CONSTRUCT THE FRONTAGE ROAD.
The construction of the frontage road had not commenced as of January 2006. At

that time, Hillcrest wrote to UDOT, expressing concern over this and proposing a
meeting with UDOT to discuss the road's construction. (R. 726-728.) Hillcrest5s letter
notified UDOT that a change in UDOT's plans to construct the frontage road "would
most likely render the Property undevelopable." (R. 727.)
UDOT initially agreed to a meeting, but then notified Hillcrest that it needed to
reschedule. (R. 740-741.) The meeting was rescheduled for November 28,2006.
However, UDOT called to cancel that meeting on November 27, 2006. (R. 744-745.)
During the phone call, UDOT informed Hillcrest that it was unwilling to reconsider its
recent decision to disavow its commitment to build the frontage road. (R. 744-745.)
14
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Afterward, both Hillcrest and the City of Centerville urged UDOT to honor its
obligation to build the frontage road. (R. 781-787,789-791.) Despite these efforts,

(

UDOT did not construct the frontage road. (R. 515.) Instead, UDOT told the City of
Centerville that the City could build the road. (R. 818-819.) UDOT has since said that it

(

renounced its plans to build the frontage road after "extensive litigation with the
environmental community." (R. 967 at 7:5-10.)
V.

DAMAGES TO THE REMAINDER PROPERTY.

t

Before the Horman Trusts conveyed the Property to UDOT, the Horman Family
used a gravel road on the Condemned Property to circumvent the wetlands and gain

^

access to the northern part of the Property. (R. 459:4-461:10, 502, 967 at 37:2-38:19.)
The section of land containing that road was conveyed to UDOT, and Hillcrest no longer
i

has access to the property. (R. 459:4-461:10, 502.) The frontage road was intended to
replace the access Hillcrest and the Horman Trusts lost in the conveyance. (R. 459:8460:16.) However, because UDOT refused to replace Hillcrest's access by building the

(

frontage road, Hillcrest has lost access and cannot reach the northern part of the
Remainder Property due to wetlands limitations. (R. 459:8-462:8, 501.) In 2008,
Hillcrest conducted its own appraisal (the "Hillcrest Appraisal") to determine the current
value of the Remainder Property and the value the property would have if UDOT
constructed the frontage road. (R. 536-622.) The Hillcrest Appraisal concluded that the
value of the Remainder Property without the frontage road was $1,350,000. (R. 542.)
But the Remainder Property would be worth $6,050,000 if UDOT completed the frontage

,

road. (R. 542.)
15
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE RIGHT OF WAY CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS AND SHOULD NOT
BE CONSTRUED TO EXCUSE UDOT'S OBLIGATION TO CONSTRUCT
THE FRONTAGE ROAD.
The district court did not follow the governing rules of contract interpretation to

determine contract ambiguity. This led the court to err when it held that the terms of the
Right of Way Contract were unambiguous and did not obligate UDOT to construct a
frontage road "as a matter of law." The district court was presented with two competing
interpretations of the Right of Way Contract. Hillcrest argued that the phrase "for a
frontage road" in the warranty deeds, as expressly incorporated into the Contract,
expressed the parties' intent that UDOT was contractually bound to build a frontage road
on Parcel C of the Condemned Property, consistent with UDOT's promises to do so. (R.
837-42.) UDOT asserted that the phrase "for a frontage road" was merely a non-binding
statement of shifting purpose that imposed no obligations on UDOT. (R. 171-72, 86869.)
Faced with these competing interpretations, along with Hillcrest's mounting
evidence of UDOT's representations that it would build the road, the district court was
required to follow the two-part test to determine contract ambiguity as established in
Ward v. International Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), and Daines v.
Vincent, 2008 UT 51,190 P.3d 1269. Under the Ward-Daines test, the district court
should have looked first to all evidence of the existing circumstances at the time of
contracting. Daines, 2008 UT 51, ]^f 27, 31. After reviewing this evidence, the court
should have determined whether Hillcrest's interpretation was reasonably supported by
16
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the language of the Contract. Id. If it was, the Contract was ambiguous and should not
have been interpreted on summary judgment as a matter of law.
The district court did not follow the Ward-Dairies test. Though Hillcrest provided
a vast array of evidence of the surrounding circumstances at the time of contracting

,

(evidence undisputed by UDOT), neither the district court's ruling nor the summary
judgment hearing transcript indicates that the court considered the evidence at all, much
(

less in light most favorable to Hillcrest, in assessing ambiguity. Further, the district court
failed to evaluate whether Hillcrest's interpretation was reasonable under the language of
the Right of Way Contract and the incorporated deeds. Instead, the court looked only at

v

the language on the face of the Contract and, based on its own interpretation of the
meaning of the words, determined the Contract was unambiguous.
Had the court correctly applied the Ward-Daines test, it should have concluded
that the Right of Way Contract is ambiguous. Evidence of the surrounding
circumstances—construed in the light most favorable to Hillcrest—confirms that the

•

parties intended that the phrase "for a frontage road" meant that UDOT would build the
frontage road at its expense. This interpretation is reasonably supported by the language
of the Right of Way Contract which states that UDOT was paying Hillcrest for
everything described in the incorporated warranty deeds. In sum, because the Contract is
at best ambiguous, the court could not interpret it as a matter of law on summary
judgment. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling and remand
this matter so that the ambiguous Contract can be interpreted in light of all extrinsic

(

evidence of the parties' intent.
17
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II.

HILLCREST HAS STANDING TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT.
The district court also erred when it held, as a matter of law, that Hillcrest had no

standing to enforce the Right of Way Contract. UDOT's bases to attack standing—that
Hillcrest's name did not appear on the Right of Way Contract and that Hillcrest was not
on the chain of title to the Condemned Property—alone are not determinative of standing.
While Hillcrest was not a signatory to the Right of Way Contract, it presented
uncontroverted evidence that Hillcrest was an assignee of the Horman Trusts and thus
had standing to enforce the Contract. (R. 719-724, 835-836, 967 at 21:20-22:16.)
Hillcrest further asserted that it had standing to enforce the Contract as the beneficiary of
the SCV Trust, one of the Horman Trusts that has since been liquidated. (R. 967 at 22:826:10.) UDOT did not refute the facts supporting Hillcrest's position. The district
court's ruling rejecting these arguments was erroneous. At the very least, Hillcrest's
evidence as construed in the light most favorable to Hillcrest, created a genuine issue of
material fact concerning Hillcrest's standing. This Court should therefore reverse the
district court's ruling that Hillcrest lacked standing to enforce the Contract.
Even if the Court determines that Hillcrest actually lacked standing, the Court
should reverse nevertheless. By separate motion, Hillcrest is asking the Court to join the
Trustees of the Horman Trusts to this action on appeal. If Hillcrest does not have
standing, the Horman Trustees do. The matter may proceed to a conclusion on the merits
with a party with standing before the Court.

18
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III.

HILLCREST HAS STANDING TO PURSUE ITS UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CLAIM.
(

Finally, the district court erred when it held that Hillcrest could not assert its cause
of action for unjust enrichment because Hillcrest had not conferred a benefit on UDOT.
(R. 929-931.) Hillcrest and its predecessors did confer a benefit on UDOT by conveying

^

the Condemned Property to UDOT without receiving compensation for the damage
caused to the Remainder Property by UDOT's taking because no frontage road was

f

constructed. (R. 849, 320.) Although Hillcrest was not on the chain of title, it was a
beneficiary of one of the trusts that conveyed property to UDOT. (R. 451.) The value of
its interest in the trust was therefore diminished. Moreover, Hillcrest is the assignee of
the Trust's property—including any claims against UDOT—and has standing to assert
the SCV Trust's unjust enrichment claim because the SCV Trust has been liquidated. (R.
719-724.) Finally, if this Court agrees with the district court's ruling that Hillcrest cannot

C

enforce the unjust enrichment claim, the Court should nevertheless reverse the summary
(

judgment order in view of Hillcrest's motion to join the Trustees of the Horman Trusts,
as noted above. The issue should be remanded so the parties have the opportunity to
prove that UDOT was unjustly enriched when it took the Condemned Property without

f

-

building the frontage road or providing compensation for the damage UDOT caused to
the Remainder Property.
ARGUMENT
Given the circumstances of this appeal, it is not perfunctory to be reminded that
summary judgment is only appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists,

^
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and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56; Hoyer
v. State of Utah, 2009 UT 38, \l,2Yl

P.3d 547. All facts and reasonable inferences to

be drawn are construed in the light most favorable to Hillcrest, the non-moving party.
flbyer,2009UT38,17.
District courts are also prohibited on summary judgment from weighing credibility
and conflicting evidence. See Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App 216, \ 14, 239 P.3d 519
("However, weighing credibility and assigning weight to conflicting evidence is not part
of the district court's role in determining summary judgment.") (citing Pigs Gun Club,
Inc. v. Sanpete County, 2002 UT 17, \ 24, 42 P.3d 379); Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Williams, 2006 UT App 500, \ 15, 153 P.3d 798 ("On a motion for summary judgment, a
trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether
issues of fact exist." (internal quotations omitted)). If there are any disputed material
facts, summary judgment is inappropriate. Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d
238, 239 (Utah 1977).
Under these well-known standards, entry of summary judgment was improper in
this case for three reasons. First, the terms of the Right of Way Contract are ambiguous
under the Ward-Daines test, and the district court should not have proceeded to interpret
them as a matter of law. Second, Hillcrest presented abundant evidence to raise more
than a genuine issue of material fact concerning its standing to enforce the Right of Way
Contract. Third, the evidence shows that UDOT was unjustly enriched when it did not
construct the frontage road.
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I.

THE RIGHT OF WAY CONTRACT IS AMBIGUOUS AND SHOULD NOT
BE CONSTRUED TO EXCUSE UDOT'S OBLIGATION TO CONSTRUCT
THE FRONTAGE ROAD.
Utah courts are instructed to follow a multi-step process when confronted with

questions of contract interpretation. Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51,fflf22, 32, 190 P.3d
1269. The first question is whether the contract is integrated. Id. at ^ 22. If it is, the
court moves to the next step-determining whether the contract is facially ambiguous. Id.
at f 24. If the answer to this is yes, the court may consider extrinsic evidence to
determine the true intentions of the contracting parties. Id. At f 27,
A contract is facially ambiguous "if it is capable of more than one reasonable

x

interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial
deficiencies." Id. at f 25 (internal quotation omitted); WebBankv. Am. Gen. Annuity
i

Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, % 20, 54 P.3d 1139; Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App 137, f 8,
234 P.3d 1156; DCHHoldings, LLC v. Nielsen, 2009 UT App 269, If 10, 220 P.3d 178.
The Utah Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether an integrated
contract is facially ambiguous in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association.8 907 P.2d

Perhaps because the controlling Ward-Daines rule for contract interpretation is
so well-established, neither UDOT nor Hillcrest cited these cases or their standards by
name in the district court. But even though the Ward-Daines rule was not expressly
cited below, the ambiguity of the Right of Way Contract and Warranty Deeds was
squarely raised (R. 841-842, 855-860.), and the agreement must still be interpreted under
the Ward-Daines rule because the rule is the controlling authority for contract
interpretation under Utah law. The district court's failure to follow clearly controlling
authority in this context was plain error justifying consideration of the proper authority
by this Court though that authority was not expressly cited to the trial court. See
Chestnut v. City of Lowell, 305 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (award of punitive damages
against city was plain error when clear Supreme Court precedent prohibited such an
award, despite defendant's failure to cite the controlling authority prior to judgment).
21

(

264 (Utah 1995). Under that test, a court must first consider all credible evidence offered
so that the court can "place itself in the same situation in which the parties found
themselves at the time of contracting." Ward, 907 P.2d at 268. After considering this
evidence, the court then must determine whether the interpretations "contended for are
reasonably supported by the language of the contract." Id. If the court finds that both
interpretations are reasonably supported by the language of the contract, the contract is
ambiguous and the court must consider extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Id. The
Ward Court recognized that this two-part test was necessary to prevent the question of
ambiguity from being determined "based solely on the extrinsic evidence of the judge's
own linguistic education and experience." Id. The Utah Supreme Court called this a
"better reasoned" approach from the test that preceded Ward in which a judge's
determination of ambiguity was limited to the terms of the writing itself. Id.
The Court elaborated on the Ward holding in Daines v. Vincent. 2008 UT 51, 190
P.3d 1269. There, the Court clarified that while a district court must consider evidence of
the surrounding circumstances to determine whether an ambiguity exists, the conclusion
that the evidence creates an ambiguity requires that the interpretation be plausible and
reasonable in light of the language the parties actually used. Daines, 2008 UT 51, ^ 27,
31. However, the Daines Court made clear that it was not returning to the pre- Ward
framework of contract interpretation. See id. atfflf24,28. It rearticulated that Ward was
designed to create a "balanced, 'better-reasoned' approach" for discerning facial
ambiguity, id. at ]f 24, and it recognized that the Ward Court had correctly applied the
two-part test. Id. atf 28.
22
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It is helpful to review how the Ward Court analyzed ambiguity under a proper
application of the two-part test. Dairies, 2008 UT 51, % 28, 190 P.3d 1269 (citing Ward,
907 P.2d at 265). The defendant in Ward applied fertilizer to Ward's Safflower Crop
using a canister that once contained a powerful herbicide, causing the crop to die. Ward,
907 P.2d at 265. After the crop was lost, the parties entered a settlement agreement
providing that Ward would release IFA from "any and all damages caused by the
spraying of his nineteen acres of safflower." Id, The following year, Ward planted beans
in the samefield,but they also died from the residual herbicide, prompting Ward to file
suit when IFA refused to redress the second loss. Id. at 266. Ward said that the release
agreement did not excuse IFA for damages to the beans because the phrase "of safflower"
meant only the safflower that had been planted the year the fertilizer had been. Id. Ward
provided evidence that he initially refused to sign the contract because he was concerned
about the lingering effects of the pesticide, that he had expressed these concerns to IFA,
and that IFA had told him not to worry and to plant beans in the field the next year. Id, at
266. IFA, on the other hand, argued that "of safflower" broadly referred to the entire
field where the safflower had been planted, so the release would apply to all damage done
to anything planted in the field. Id. at 269. The court considered evidence of the
surrounding circumstances and held that Ward's interpretation of the language was
plausible, thus rendering the phrase "of safflower" facially ambiguous and subject to
interpretation by extrinsic evidence. Id.
Like the parties in Ward, Hillcrest and UDOT interpreted the Right of Way
Contract differently. Hillcrest's interpretation emphasized how the Right of Way
23

Contract incorporated the deeds and all their terms. (R. 837-842.) Hillcrest asserted that
the phrase "for a frontage road" in the incorporated warranty deeds for Parcel C meant
that UDOT was required to build a frontage road. (R. 837-842.) Hillcrest presented
evidence of UDOT's representations to the Horman Trusts that UDOT would build the
road, and had factored the road's value into the calculation for compensating the Horman
Trusts for their land. (R. 320, 495:7-496:8.)
UDOT did not dispute this or that the terms of the warranty deeds were
incorporated into the Right of Way Contract. Instead it argued that the phrase "for a
frontage road" taken alone did not obligate UDOT to construct a frontage road. (R. 171172, 868-869). UDOT argued that the warranty deeds just contained legal descriptions of
the conveyed property and the phrase "for a frontage road" was nothing more than a nonbinding and changeable "statement of public purpose for the acquisition." (R. 172, 868.)
Notwithstanding these plausible conflicting interpretations, which trigger the twopart Ward-Daines test, the district court did not apply the test to assess ambiguity.
Instead, the court held that the contract was integrated and that its language was "plain,"
and "clear and unambiguous," making consideration of extrinsic evidence inappropriate
in the court's view. (R. 925-926.) The court then concluded that the phrase "for a
frontage road" was simply a statement of general purpose that did not impose an
obligation on UDOT to construct the promised frontage road. (R. 926.)
The district court's ruling was plain error. Although the Contract was
undisputedly "integrated," this does not end the inquiry. The court was required to look
first at the evidence of the circumstances at the time of contracting, and then assess
24
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c
whether Hillcrest's interpretation was reasonable under the language of the Contract.
Dairies, 2008 UT 51, ff 27, 31. Had it followed these steps, the district court would have
determined that the Contract was ambiguous and could not be interpreted as a matter of
law.

(
A.

The District Court Failed to Place Itself in the Parties9 Situation at the
Time of Contracting,

The district court did not follow Utah contract-construction law because it failed to

r

consider evidence of the surrounding circumstances in determining whether the Right of
Way Contract was ambiguous. To complete the first step in the Ward-Daines analysis,
the court had to "place itself in the same situation in which the parties found themselves
at the time of contracting." Ward, 907 P.2d at 268. Had the district court done so, it
would have had a lot to consider. Hillcrest presented ample and unchallenged evidence

. (

of the surrounding circumstances. As in Ward, this evidence included representations
made by the other contracting party (UDOT) and evidence of contract negotiations.
\
v.

Hillcrest's evidence included:
1) the UDOT Appraisal stating that there was no need for UDOT to increase its
compensation to the Horman Trusts for damages caused to the remainder of the
property because UDOT was going to build a frontage road on the property at
its own expense, and that the frontage road would be "vastly superior" to the
then-existing access, (R. 320, 828.);

25

2) the draft warranty deeds for Parcel 173:C attached to the UDOT Appraisal, all
of which stated the land was being conveyed "for afrontageroad," (R. 350357.);
3) the Condemnation Resolution, which was attached to UDOT's 2001
Condemnation Complaint, stating that the singular public purpose for taking
Parcel 67:173:C from the Horman Trusts was "for a frontage road incident to
the construction of a freeway," (R. 384, 829.);
4) the maps attached to the UDOT Appraisal, the Condemnation Resolution, and
the UDOT Offer Letter to the Horman Trusts indicating the location of a road
on Parcel C labeled "FRTG. RD," (R. 369), or "Frontage Road and Recreation
Trail," (R. 390 at HILL 0934, 394.);
5) statements made by the Horman Trusts to UDOT that they planned to
commercially develop the Property prior to UDOT's announcement that it
would condemn part of the land, (R. 238-239.);
6) correspondence between the City of Centerville and UDOT in which UDOT
represented that it would construct a frontage road to allow the Horman Trusts'
development to go forward, (R. 689.);
7) deposition testimony of UDOT's Todd Jensen that UDOT intended that the
property owners and the court would rely on the UDOT Appraisal and believe
the contents of the UDOT Appraisal were truthful, (R. 467:10-468:24); and
8) UDOT's David West's testimony that during the negotiations of the Contract,
he told the Horman Trusts' attorney that a frontage road "was going to be
26
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constructed along the east boundary of the remainder by UDOT." (R. 495:7-

22.)

••

•

-

Taken in the light most favorable to Hillcrest, as it must be, the evidence confirms
that UDOT and the Horman Trusts intended and agreed that UDOT would build a
frontage road on Parcel 173:C in consideration of the Horman Trusts' deeds. The
frontage road to be built by UDOT was associated with Parcel 173:C from the beginning
of the condemnation negotiations. (R. 350-357.) It was included in the UDOT
Appraisal, in the Condemnation Resolution, marked on maps, and discussed between the
parties during their settlement negotiations. (R. 350-357, 384, 392-394,471:15-22,
495:7-22.) The Right of Way Contract is the final result of these negotiations.
Under Ward, the district court should have considered all this evidence to put itself
in the place of the parties at the time of contracting before determining whether the
Contract was ambiguous. But the district court omitted this required step under the
Ward-Daines test and instead ended its analysis at the Contract's integration clause. This
failure is punctuated by the transcript of the summary judgment hearing. There, Hillcrest
cited to the Condemnation Resolution. (R. 967 at 28:15-25.) However, instead of
evaluating this as evidence of the surrounding circumstances, the court remarked, "That's
nice. Isn't that parol evidence?" (R. 967 at 29:4.) The exchange continued, with the
court asking Hillcrest whether there was any language in the Contract that required
UDOT to build the frontage road. (R. 967 at 30:2-3.) When Hillcrest's trial attorney
explained that the warranty deeds were incorporated into the Right of Way Contract, the
Court stated, "Well, I don't want to play with words, but it's not in the document, it's in
27

the deed? And that's all I need to know." (R. 967 at 30:17-22 (emphasis supplied).) The
court then questioned Hillcrest's attorney further on the language of the deed. When
Hillcrest argued that the phrase "for a frontage road" required UDOT to build the
frontage road, the Court stated that it could not consider any extrinsic evidence unless it
concluded that the language is ambiguous. (R. 967 at 31:2-32:11.)
Finally the district court's failure to consider evidence of the surrounding
circumstances is confirmed by its Ruling. The Court went directly to the language of the
Contract and characterized it as "plain," "clear and unambiguous." (R. 925-926.) It did
not consider any of Hillcrest's evidence of the surrounding circumstances at the time of
contracting in determining ambiguity. Indeed, the court expressly refused to consider
the evidence, stating that due to the "plain language" of the contract, it must conclude
that UDOT was not obligated to build the frontage road "despite any representations
made by UDOT during initial negotiations and settlement negotiations with the Horman
Family Trusts." (R. 926.) Thus, the district court's conclusion on ambiguity collides with
Ward and Dairies, and was ultimately based on the judge's own linguistic education and
experience—the type of analysis that Ward and Dairies sought to prevent.
B.

Hillcrest's Interpretation Is Supported by the Language of the Right of
Way Contract.

The district court also failed to apply the second part of the Ward-Daines test to
consider whether Hillcrest's interpretation was reasonably supported by the language of
the Contract. To determine the meaning of a contract, courts look for a reading that
harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision meaningless. Encon Utah,
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LLC v. Fluor Ames Kraemer, LLC, 2009 UT 7, f 15, 210 P.3d 263; see also Flores v.
Earnshaw, 2009 UT App 90, f 8, 209 P.3d 428 (recognizing courts construe contractual
provisions "with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none" (internal quotation
omitted)). Similarly, courts disfavor interpretations that would render contracts void or
unenforceable. Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d 852, 858 (Utah 1998) ("The
choice of contract interpretations which avoid invalidating an agreement is favored under
Utah law."); Stangl v. Todd, 554 P.2d 1316, 1319-20 (Utah 1976) ("This court has long
adhered to the principle that in construing a contract, a construction giving an instrument
a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will be adopted where reasonable, and between
two possible constructions that will be adopted which establishes a valid contract.").
Guided by these principals, the district court should have concluded that language
of the Right of Way Contract "reasonably supports" Hillcrest's interpretation that the
Contract incorporates terms of the warranty deeds (and it does), and that the phrase "for a
frontage road" in fact obligates UDOT to build a frontage road at its expense.
1.

The language of the Right of Way Contract incorporates the
warranty deeds.

Contracting parties may incorporate the terms of another document into their
contracts. Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc., 930 P.2d 268, 273 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996); 11 Richard A. Lord, WlLLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30.25 (4th ed.). An
outside document is incorporated into a contract if the contract clearly and unequivocally
references the terms of the document and the document is known to or easily available to
both parties. Sizzling Platter, 930 P.2d at 273. When a contract incorporates another
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document by reference, the terms of the other document become "constructively part of
the writing, and in that respect the two form a single instrument." 11 Richard A. Lord,
WlLLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30.25 (4th ed.). Accordingly, the incorporated document
"is to be interpreted as part of the writing." Id; see also Sizzling Platter, 930 P.2d at 273
(holding document incorporated terms of former lease thus creating a new agreement that
included the terms of the former lease).
The Right of Way Contract incorporates the terms of the warranty deeds,
including the phrase "for a frontage road." (R. 415.) Together the Right of Way
Contract and warranty deeds reasonably support Hillcrest's interpretation. The Right of
Way Contract provides that UDOT is paying cash "for the following . . . Land described
in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173:C." (R. 415) (emphasis supplied).) The warranty deeds
match that language, stating that Hillcrest is conveying "the following described parcel of
land . . . to-wit: An undivided . . . interest in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage road."
(R. 417, 423, 429, 435)(emphasis supplied).) Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the
terms of the warranty deeds for Parcel C—including the phrase "for a frontage road"—
were included in the description of the property being conveyed.
This interpretation also satisfies the rules of incorporation. The warranty deeds
were available to both UDOT and the Horman Trusts when unexecuted replicas were
exchanged and approved prior to the date the Right of Way Contract was executed.
(R. 350-357.) Moreover, the Right of Way Contract clearly identifies the warranty deeds
for the parcels being condemned by UDOT. (R. 415.) These deeds are not just
referenced in passing, but are used as the description of the property being conveyed to
30
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UDOT. (R. 415.) In fact, if the warranty deeds had not been incorporated into the Right
of Way Contract, it would be impossible to identify the property to be conveyed to
UDOT or the property's purpose since the Contract does not contain any legal property
descriptions, as required for it to be valid under Utah law. See Rocky Mountain Energy v.
Utah State Tax Comm % 852 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah 1993); Wasatch Mines Co. v.
Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Utah 1970). Even the parcel numbers identifying the
warranty deeds fail to provide the legal descriptions as they are internal numbers assigned
to the property by UDOT, and not legal descriptions. (R. 480:9-482:9.)
UDOT did not dispute that the Contract incorporates the terms of the warranty
deeds. Even the district court appeared to agree with Hillcrest, stating that the Contract
specifically referenced the terms of the deeds. (R. 926.) And based on the language of
the Contract, it is reasonable to conclude that the terms of the warranty deeds are
incorporated by reference and are part of the Contract.
2.

The phrase "for a frontage road" can reasonably be construed to
obligate UDOT to construct the frontage road.

Hillcrest interprets the Contract as requiring UDOT to build a frontage road on the
Condemned Property at UDOT's expense, consistent with UDOT's previous
representations (R. 320, 390 at HILL 934, 514-515, 713-714,495:7-17.) This
interpretation is reasonable under the language of the Contract. Indeed, Hillcrest's
interpretation of the phrase "for a frontage road" gives it meaning and avoids an
interpretation in which the phrase would be superfluous. See Flores, 2009 UT App 90, ^j
8.
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Conversely, the district court's interpretation that the phrase "merely reflects that
the purchased property may be used for a frontage road" renders the phrase meaningless
and actually reads non-existent terms into the Contract. (R. 926 (emphasis supplied).)
And, contrary to the district court's characterization, the deeds do not include any term
granting UDOT unfettered discretion on use, such as "may be used." (R. 423-424,429430, 435-436, 417-418.) Had the Horman Trusts intended to allow UDOT to take their
land, including their only access to be used for any purpose, as UDOT claimed and the
court held, there would have been no reason to include the phrase "for a frontage road."
The parties simply would have conveyed the land without imposing any restrictions on its
use or purpose if UDOT's Construction of the Frontage Road were not contemplated.
Consistent with Hillcrest's reading, the Right of Way Contract also contemplates
that UDOT will perform additional work on the Condemned Property in a "workmanlike
manner." (R. 415). Likewise, where the property was being conveyed to the Utah
Department of Transportation—an entity charged with building roads—it is reasonable to
construe the phrase "for a frontage road" as imposing an obligation on UDOT to actually
build the road. Further, the phrase "for a frontage road" in the warranty deeds for Parcel
C matches the phrase "for a freeway" in the deeds for Parcel 0067:173 A, and the phrase
"for a utility corridor" in the deeds for Parcel 0067:173. (R. 419, 421, 425,427, 431, 437,
439.) It cannot be disputed that this language describes what UDOT would do with the
Condemned Property at UDOT's expense. It does not describe what the owners of the
Remainder Property would do with the Condemned Property or what any other third
party would do with it. It is more than reasonable to interpret the phrase "for a frontage
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road" in the same manner, which happens to be consistent with UDOT's representations
that it would build the frontage road on Parcel C. (R. 320, 390 at 934, 495:7-17, 514515,713-714.)
Just as the Ward Court considered the extrinsic evidence of circumstances at the
time of contracting to determine whether the phrase "of safflower" was ambiguous, the
district court had to consider the extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding
UDOT's contract with the Horaian Trusts to determine whether the phrase "for a frontage
road" is ambiguous. The district court's failure to do this was plain error. And the
extrinsic evidence, particularly when construed in the light most favorable to Hillcrest,
powerfully supports Hillcrest's intent that the phrase "for a frontage road" requires
UDOT to build the road at its expense. This interpretation is "reasonable" under the
language of the Contract and general rules of contract interpretation. Thus, under Ward
and Dairies, the Contract is ambiguous.
C.

The Interpretation of an Ambiguous Contact is a Question of Fact

Because the terms of the Contract are ambiguous, the district court erred when it
concluded as a matter of law that the Right of Way Contract does not obligate UDOT to
construct a frontage road. This is so because the interpretation of an ambiguous contract
presents a question of fact that is not resolved on summary judgment. WebBank v. Am.
Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp., 2002 UT 88, f 22, 54 P.3d 1139; Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.,
2002 UT 43, f 14, 48 P.3d 918. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the district
court's ruling in which the district court interpreted the meaning of the Right of Way
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Contract, and remand this case so the fact finder can consider extrinsic evidence of the
parties' intent.
II.

HILLCREST HAS STANDING TO ENFORCE THE CONTRACT.
UDOT has attempted to escape its obligation to build the frontage road in large

part by arguing that Hillcrest lacks privity and thus has no standing to assert contract
claims against UDOT. UDOT rests its argument on two points: Hillcrest was not a party
to the Contract and Hillcrest was not in the chain of title of the Condemned Property. (R.
170, 867-868.) While it is true that a contract is generally enforced by a party with
privity, Shire Development v. Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), a party need not be a contract signatory in order to have the required privity to
establish standing. As shown below, other means confer standing to enforce a contract.
Here, Hillcrest has acquired standing because the Horman Trusts conveyed these rights
and because Hillcrest was a beneficiary of the Horman Trusts. Hillcrest presented the
district court with evidence of this, but the district court failed to consider it, opting
instead to accept UDOT's oversimplified theory of standing. This ruling was also
incorrect and should be reversed.
A,

Hillcrest Provided Evidence that It Was the Horman Trusts9 Assignee,

The district court's summary judgment was incorrect because Hillcrest raised a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Horman Trusts had conveyed to Hillcrest
all rights underlying the Right of Way Contract. Generally, all beneficial rights to a
contract may be freely assigned. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah
1991). Once a contract is assigned, the assignee "[stands] in the shoes of the assignor"
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and may enforce the contract just as if it had been an original contracting party. Sunridge

(

Development Corp. v.RB&G Engineering, Inc., 2010 UT 6,fflj13, 15, 230 P.3d 1000
(citing 9 John E. Murray, Jr., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 51.1 (rev. ed. 2007)).
Parties need not follow any particular formalities in making an assignment so long

f

as the assignment identifies the subject matter of the assignment "with sufficient
particularity to render it capable of identification." Stoller v. Exchange National Bank of
(

Chicago, 557 N.E.2d 438, 443 (111. App. 1990); see also Morris v. George C Banning,
Inc., 11 N.E. 2d 372, 373 (Ohio App. 1947) (recognizing that if the intent to assign is
demonstrated in the instrument, the assignment is effective "however crude it may be

C

expressing the purpose and intention of the parties to the transaction"); 6 AM. JUR.
Assignments § 83 ("Any language, however informal, that indicates the intention of the
(

owner of a claim or chose in action to transfer it, is sufficient to vest the property in the
assignee."). If an assignment is made by a written document, Utah courts rely on general
(

principles of contract interpretation. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah
1991). Thus, as discussed above, courts must follow the Ward-Daines analysis by
considering all evidence at the time of contracting and then analyzing whether the party's
interpretation is reasonable under the language of the contract. Daines, 2008 UT 51, ^
27, 31. If a court determines that an ambiguity exists, the intent of the parties becomes a
question of fact. SME Industries, Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback and Associates,

(

Inc., 2001 UT 54, % 14, 28 P.3d 669.
As evidence that the Horman Trusts conveyed their interests in the Right of Way
Contract to Hillcrest, Hillcrest produced the REPC in which the Trusts agreed to convey
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property and property rights. (R. 719-724.) Hillcrest specifically directed the district
court to the key REPC terms that convey "all real estate, water rights, water shares and
property rights owned by the Seller" as described on Exhibit A to the REPC and "all real
estate, water rights, water shares and property rights which may be later discovered to be
owned by Seller [the Horman Trusts] at the time of the execution of this Purchase
Contract." (R. 720.)
Hillcrest pointed to more evidence consistent with the intent of the Horman Trusts
to assign the Right of Way Contract to Hillcrest, including evidence that Hillcrest was
already a beneficiary of the SCV Trust and was therefore a "related" party (R. 450:18451:24.), and evidence that the trusts had been liquidated, (R. 452:19-453:7.). UDOT
did not controvert this evidence or argue that the REPC did not constitute an assignment.
Indeed, UDOT conceded that "plaintiff [Hillcrest] is the successor in interest to the
Horman trusts." (R. 167.) This alone can establish Hillcrest's standing to assert claims
that the Horman Trusts could assert. Heisman Trophy Trust v. Smack Apparel Co., 637
F. Supp. 2d 146, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); see also Ist Home Liquidating Trust v. U.S., 76
Fed. CI. 731, 743 (Fed. CI. 2007) ("only original investors or legal successors in interest
have standing to recover"), rev'don other grounds, 581 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
This evidence, including the REPC, met Hillcrest's burden under Rule 56, Utah
R. Civ. P, to come forward with evidence to rebut UDOT's claims. However, the district
court overlooked UDOT's acknowledgment that Hillcrest is the successor in interest to
the Horman Trusts, and incorrectly weighed and swept Hillcrest's evidence aside on
summary judgment without analysis, saying
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Hillcrest has failed to present sufficient competent evidence that it
was a beneficiary of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family
Trusts, that the Horman Family Trusts have assigned to Hillcrest any
claims they may have against UDOT, or any other evidence to
establish a privity relationship with the Horman Family Trusts or
UDOT.
(R. 925 n. 4 (emphasis supplied).) The district court repeated this conclusory statement
in its ruling. (R. 929, 930.) Yet, it provided no analysis of the evidence in connection
with this holding. The court's holdings regarding the sufficiency of the evidence were
thus incorrect.
It bears repeating on summary judgment, the court is obligated to construe all
facts, and any inferences that can be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, ^ 7. Under this standard, the language of
the REPC conveyed the right to assert a breach of the Right of Way Contract. And, at the
very least, this standard required the district court to review the contractual language of
the REPC using principals of contract interpretation to determine whether the REPC was
ambiguous. This the court did not do. It did not consider the sworn testimony
confirming that Hillcrest was a beneficiary of one of the Horman Family Trusts. (R. 451,
520, 921-925.) And it did not address the REPC's affect on Hillcrest's claim that the
Horman Trusts conveyed rights under the Right of Way Contract, or even whether the
language of the REPC could allow a fair-minded fact-finder to rule in Hillcrest's favor.
Rather, the district court's only mention of the REPC is in its "Findings of Undisputed
Material Facts." (R. 923,fflf12-13.) The district court found that "Hillcrest entered a
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Real Estate Purchase Contract for the purchase of the . . . remaining property located
adjacent to the three (3) parcels previously conveyed to UDOT." (R. 923, ^ 12.)
On its own, this finding misconstrues the REPC, which did not just convey the
Remainder Property, but also conveyed property located in Nevada and Kentucky. (R.
719-720.) But combined with the immediately following finding, this creates a larger
misunderstanding. The court's next finding indicates that the REPC contains a recital
that the Horman Trusts were "desirous of selling the Property at a discounted price that
properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in developing and selling the
Property to independent third parties." (R. 923 at % 13.) While this finding quotes
language from the REPC, the immediate placement of this recital after the incorrect
finding about what property was actually conveyed by the REPC suggests that the district
court mistakenly inferred that the recital applied to the construction of the frontage road.
(R. 923.) But neither party made this assertion, and there is no evidence that this recital
applied to the Remainder Property as opposed to the property in Kentucky or Nevada or
that it was at all related to the frontage road. (R. 923.) This finding shows that the court
did not construe the evidence—much less all reasonable inferences that could be drawn
from the evidence—in the light most favorable to Hillcrest. Instead, the court's
unsupported finding that the evidence was "insufficient" and "incompetent" indicates the
court improperly weighed Hillcrest's evidence against Hillcrest. (R. 925 n. 4.)
If the district court had correctly construed the evidence—in the light most
favorable to Hillcrest—it would have concluded that Hillcrest's interpretation of the
REPC was plausible and that the REPC raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
38
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Hillcrest's standing. The language of the REPC conveyed all "property rights" that were
listed on Exhibit A, and all those rights that were unknown at the time of contracting. (R.
720.) But this is not all. The REPC acknowledges that the Horman Trusts wished to
convert all of their assets to cash and then liquidate, that Hillcrest was a related party, and
that Hillcrest was purchasing the property referenced in the REPC to "facilitate" the
liquidation of the trusts. (R. 719.) Further, the evidence indicates that at the time the
REPC was executed, the parties did not foresee that UDOT would refuse to construct the
frontage road. (R. 967 at 44:1-8.) This explains why the rights and claims arising under
the Right of Way Contract were not identified by name in the REPC.
In light of this evidence and the contractual language, Hillcrest's interpretation
that the conveyance of "property rights" under the REPC included rights and claims
under the Right of Way Contract is more than just plausible. As a result, the REPC is at
the very least ambiguous. As a result, the district court should not have concluded on
summary judgment that it was "incompetent" or insufficient to assign the Horman Trusts'
claims to Hillcrest. The court's ruling should be reversed and remanded so that Hillcrest
has the opportunity to prove the assignment to the fact-finder.
B.

Issues of Fact Regarding Whether the Horman Trusts Were
Liquidated Preclude Summary Judgment,

Even if the Horman Trusts had not conveyed their interest in the Right of Way
Contract to Hillcrest, the district court should not have granted summary judgment to
UDOT on the issue of standing because evidence suggested that the Horman Trusts had
been liquidated. "When a valid trust is created, the beneficiaries become the owners of
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the equitable or beneficial title to the trust property and are considered the real owners."
Faulkner v. Bost, 137 S.W.3d 254, 258 (Tex. App. 2004) (internal quotation omitted).
Once a trust expires, "the legal title, which was vested in the trustee, then vests in the
equitable title holder, the two titles merge, and the equitable title holder becomes the
owner of a full fee interest." Mercantile Trust Company, N.A. v. Hardy, 39 S.W.3d 907,
913 (Mo. App. 2001) (citations omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts s §
345, cmt. b ("After the lapse of a long period of time after the accomplishment of the
purposes of the trust, a conveyance by the trustee to the beneficiary may be presumed.").
Moreover, when a trust is terminated or no longer has a trustee, a beneficiary can file a
suit in its own name to enforce any claims necessary to protect his interest. Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 282 (3); Wakefield v. Phillips, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 7338, *4
(Tex. App. 2007) (beneficiaries of terminated trust had legal title and standing to file
partition action).9 This is because it would be irrational to require "the beneficiary to
bring a suit for the appointment of a new trustee, and to compel the new trustee to bring a
separate action against the third person." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 282 cmt. g;
see also Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(relying on Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 282 to hold that beneficiary has standing
to bring action to protect beneficiary's interest when trustee fails to do so).
In this case, Hillcrest raised an issue of fact regarding whether the Horman Family
Trusts had liquidated all of their assets before this action was filed. (R. 452:19-453:7.)
Hillcrest offered the deposition testimony of David Evans that the Horman Trusts had
9

A copy of Wakefield is attached as Addendum 5.
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liquidated and that Hillcrest was a beneficiary of the SCV Trust. (R. 451:9-453:7, 520.)
UDOT never disputed this evidence. If the Horman Trusts had liquidated, all legal title
to property held by the Trust would have passed to and vested in the beneficiaries of the
trust, including Hillcrest. When construed in the light most favorable to Hillcrest, the
sworn testimony that Hillcrest was a beneficiary of the SCV Trust and that the Trust had
liquidated was enough at least to create an issue of fact regarding whether the rights
under the UDOT Right of Way Contract had been distributed to Hillcrest and whether
Hillcrest, a trust beneficiary, had acquired standing to enforce the Contract in its own
name. Thus, the district court's summary judgment ruling was erroneous in all events.
C.

Hillcrest Has Asked the Court to Join the Trustees to this Litigation.

Alternatively, if the Court grants Hillcrest's Motion for Joinder and adds the
Horman Trusts as plaintiffs, the Court should reverse the district court's ruling on
standing and address the merits of the breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims. If
the Horman Trusts conveyed their rights under the Right of Way Contract to Hillcrest, or
if the SCV Trust had liquidated and disbursed its assets to its beneficiaries (who included
Hillcrest), then Hillcrest has standing. On the other hand, if the Horman Trusts did not
convey their rights under the Right of Way Contract to Hillcrest, as the district court
implies,10 and did not disburse that trust asset to the beneficiaries, then the Horman Trusts
have standing. Because there are issues of fact concerning whether Hillcrest or the
Horman Trusts have the right to enforce the Contract, Hillcrest has asked that the

10

The district court found insufficient evidence "that the Horman Family Trusts
assigned Hillcrest any claims that they may have against UDOT." (R. 929-930.)
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Horman Trustees be joined to this dispute. Joinder will resolve the issue of standing
because the proper party in interest will be before the Court. In that event, the Court
should reverse the district court's dismissal of Hillcrest's claims on standing grounds.
See Hillcrest Investment Company's Motion for Joinder, filed August 8, 2011.
III.

HILLCREST HAS STANDING TO PURSUE ITS UNJUST ENRICHMENT
CLAIM.
The Court should also reverse the district court's denial of Hillcrest's unjust

enrichment claim. To establish unjust enrichment, Hillcrest must show that it conferred a
benefit on UDOT, that UDOT appreciated and had knowledge of the benefit, and that
UDOT accepted and retained the benefit "under such circumstances as to make it
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its value." Desert
Miriah, Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 2000 UT 83,113, 12 UT P.3d 580.
The district court held that Hillcrest could not prove these elements because
Hillcrest was not a record title holder of the Condemned Property and because Hillcrest
did not purchase the Remainder Property until years after the execution of the Right of
Way Contract. (R. 924-925.) But, as shown above, Hillcrest has standing to enforce any
claim the SCV Trust had if the SCV Trust has been liquidated and does not have a
trustee. As a beneficiary, the claim would have passed to Hillcrest. Mercantile Trust
Co., NA v. Hardy, 39 S.W.3d 907, 913 (Mo. App. 2001). Even if it did not, Hillcrest has
raised an issue of fact as to whether the Horman Trusts conveyed their causes of action to
Hillcrest under the REPC. (R. 720.) Finally, Hillcrest is moving to join the trustees to
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this lawsuit. If they are joined, those with legal title to the property at the time of the
UDOT conveyance will be before the Court.
Hillcrest (or the Horman Trusts) can establish each element for relief from
UDOT's unjust enrichment. First, they can prove that they conferred a benefit on UDOT.
The UDOT Appraisal concluded that UDOT owed the Horman Trusts nothing more than
the suggested total award for the property taken because the value of the UDOTconstructed frontage road supplied added consideration. (R. 320, 321.) However, neither
the Horman Trusts nor Hillcrest received that consideration because UDOT refused to
build the road. And while UDOT argued on summary judgment that it received no imjust
benefit because it paid the Horman Trusts $1.9 million, when the UDOT Appraisal
suggested a total award of $1.27 million, UDOT failed to tell the district court that the
UDOT Appraisal's total award amount excluded the substantial value of the frontage
road. (R. 320.) Moreover, Hillcrest's Appraisal showed the value of the Remainder
Property with a frontage road was $6.05 million. (R. 542.) This confirmed that the
damage to the Remainder Property far exceeds the amount UDOT paid. UDOT did not
compensate the Horman Trusts for this lost value or reimburse the Horman Trusts for the
costs they would incur in building the road themselves to realize that lost value. (R. 320,
393.)
Ultimately, the beneficiaries (including Hillcrest) experienced the injury because
the Trusts' assets were significantly less valuable upon distribution without the road or
fair compensation from UDOT. The damage to the Trusts and Hillcrest was made worse
because the property UDOT took without leaving a frontage road deprived them of
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access to the Property. (R. 459:4-462:8, 502.) Yet the district court inexplicably ruled
"as a matter of law" that "UDOT did not receive a benefit for which it did not
compensate the Horman Family Trusts . . . . " (R. 930.) This ruling is contrary to the
evidence, which should have been considered in the light most favorable to Hillcrest, and
apparently resulted from weighing UDOT's evidence on payment and appraisal amounts
in UDOT's favor. This was contrary to the standards governing summary judgment.
Hoyer, 2009 UT 38, % 7.
Second, UDOT appreciated the benefit conferred upon it. UDOT was fully aware
that it had promised to build a frontage road on the Condemned Property as part of the
settlement of the condemnation action. (R. 168, 320, 394, 471:10-14, 468:3-24, 495:717). Indeed, UDOT admitted that it planned to build the frontage road at the time it
acquired the Condemned Property. (R. 168.) And UDOT was fully aware that the
Horman Trusts and Hillcrest expected UDOT to build the frontage road as represented.
(R. 726-728, 789-791). Nevertheless, UDOT did not construct the frontage road, (R.
515.), choosing instead to retain all of the Condemned Property and the funds that would
have been used for construction. UDOT cannot seriously argue that it was unaware of
these benefits.
Third, UDOT retained these benefits to the detriment of the Horman Trusts, and it
is inequitable to allow UDOT to avoid its obligation to build the frontage road without
compensating Hillcrest—as a beneficiary of and as a successor-in-interest to the Horman
Trusts—for the damages caused by UDOT's taking. UDOT may argue, as it did on
summary judgment, that it abandoned its plans to construct the frontage road after
44
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"extensive litigation with the environmental community." (R. 967 at 7:5-10.) But this
does not excuse UDOT's obligations to the Horman Trusts or UDOT's retention of all of

C

the Condemned Property, including Parcel C, without providing fair compensation for the
value of the frontage road. Such bait-and-switch practices would not be tolerated
between two private parties, and are no more justified because one party is a public
entity. UDOT's decisions come with consequences. If UDOT is not going to build the
promised frontage road, it must compensate the Horman Trusts and their successor for
the injury that decision caused. Any other result is inequitable. The district court's
ruling was therefore erroneous and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court should reverse the district court's summary
judgment order and remand this matter to the district court for consideration of all
evidence necessary to construe the Right of Way contract consistent with the parties'
intent, evidence related to Hillcrest's standing to assert claims in this matter, and
evidence showing UDOT was unjustly enriched.
DATED THIS 8th day of August, 2011.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.

David L. Ampgron
Erin T. Midmeton
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CHAPMAN & CUTLER LLP
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45
OT /~(

A1 1 A O O ,

c

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing corrected
APPELLANTS BRIEF was served this //
mail, postage prepaid upon the following:
Randy S Hunter
Brent A. Burnett
Assistant Attorneys General
Mark L. Shurtleff
Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858

46
SLC 911988.4

th day of August, 2011, via regular U.S.

Addenda

1. Ruling and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, March 8,
2011
2. Map, UDOT Condemnation Resolution
3. Right of Way Contract
4. Warranty Deeds for Parcel C
5. Unpublished decision: Wakefield v. Philips, 2007 WL 2505634 (Tex. App. 2007)

Tabl

M A R - 8 2011
SECOND

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
HILLCREST INVESTMENT
COMPANY, LLC,

RULING AND ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Case No. 080700723
Judge John R. Morris

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The
Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along with their supporting and
supplemental materials, and the Court's case file. The Court also held a hearing on the matter on December 27, 2010. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully advised in
the premises, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Hillcrest Investment Company, LLC ("Hillcrest") initiated this action on
December 1, 2008, filing a complaint against Defendant Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") that alleged six (6) causes of action: (1) breach of contract regarding
UDOT's failure to construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of
the Legacy Parkway Project; (2) declaratory judgment regarding UDOT's obligation to construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway
Project; (3) specific performance requiring UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road
on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project; (4)fraudulentinducement pertaining to UDOT's representations that it would pay for and construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project; (5) negligent misrepresentation pertaining to UDOT's representations that it would pay for and
construct a frontage road on certain real property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway

Ruling and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Case No. 080700723
Project; and (6) unjust enrichment for the reduced purchase price and severance damages
conferred on UDOT for its purchase of certain real property as part of the Legacy Parkway
Project. On December 18, 2008, UDOT filed its answer to Hillcrest's complaint denying
liability.
On August 3, 2010, UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment seeking the dismissal on each of Hillcrest's claims. Specifically, UDOT argues that Hillcrest's contract
claims are barred as Hillcrest lacks any contractual privity with UDOT and because UDOT
was not obligated to pay for and construct a frontage road as part of its purchase of the
property for the Legacy Parkway Project, that Hillcrest's fraud and misrepresentation claims
are barred by Hillcrest's failure to file a notice of claim in compliance with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, and that Hillcrest's unjust enrichment claim fails as a benefit was
not conferred upon UDOT for which UDOT did not provide compensation.
Hillcrest filed its memorandum in opposition to UDOT's motion on September 10,
2010. In its opposition, Hillcrest argues that as a beneficial part-owner of the property at the
time of UDOT's purchase, Hillcrest was in privity of contract with UDOT, and that language within the warranty deeds that conveyed the property to UDOT obligated UDOT to
pay for and construct a frontage road on the property as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
Hillcrest further argues that it complied with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah's notice of claim requirement as UDOT had actual notice of Hillcrest's claims. Finally, Hillcrest
argues that equity necessitates recovery for the reduced purchase price and severance damages that UDOT received when it purchased the subject properties after representing that it
would pay for and construct a frontage road on the property.
On September 29, 2010, UDOT filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion
for summary judgment reasserting its prior arguments. That same day, UDOT also filed a
request to submit its motion for decision.
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On December 27, 2010, the Court held a hearing on UDOT's motion for summary
judgment.1 At the hearing, the Court ruled that it would overlook the technical defects in
the parties' pleadings2 as the issues are relatively straightforward, neither party would be
prejudiced, and because judicial economy favored a determination on the motion's merits
rather than its mere refiling and rebriefing. Following argument by the parties, the Court
took the matter under advisement. Accordingly, the Court finds that briefing on UDOT's
motion for summary judgment is complete and that the matter is now ripe for determination.
FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
1.

Sometime in the 1990's, UDOT announced plans for the construction of the

Legacy Parkway Project.
2.

In September 2001, following unsuccessful negotiations for the purchase of

three (3) parcels of real property located west of Interstate 15 in Centerville, Utah for the
Legacy Parkway Project, UDOT filed a condemnation action against the property's owners:
the trustees of the Namroh Trust; the trustees of the Phares T. Horman Family Trust; the
trustees of the SCV Horman Family Trust; and the trustees of the Theodore and Birdie
Horman Family Trust (collectively, the "Horman Family Trusts").
3.

Hillcrest was not a party to the condemnation action, and at the time of die

condemnation action's filing, Hillcrest was not a record tideholder or lien holder of the

Also pending at the hearing were Hillcrest's motion to strike portions of UDOT's reply memorandum and Hillcrest's motion to reconsider the Court's order denying Hillcrest's ex parte motion to file
overlength opposition memorandum.
2

Hillcrest argued in its opposing memorandum that denial of UDOT's motion is appropriate due to
UDOT's failure to separately number its statement of undisputed facts. See Utah R. Civ. P.
7(c)(3)(A). Additionally, the Court rejected Hillcrest's request to file an overlength opposition memorandum and Hillcrest failed to subsequently file an opposition memorandum of appropriate
length. See Id. at 7(c)(2).
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Horman Family Trusts' property, but had invested funds for the property's development as
an industrial park.
4.

As part of the initial negotiations and settlement negotiations regarding the pur-

chase of the three (3) parcels, UDOT made representations to the Horman Family Trusts
and Centerville City that its plans for the Legacy Parkway Project would include the construction of a frontage road on the property.
5.

On November 8, 2001, UDOT made an offer to settle the condemnation action,

which the Horman Family Trusts accepted.
6.

In January 2002, pursuant to the condemnation action's settlement, UDOT and

the Horman Family Trusts entered Right of Way Contracts for the purchase of the three (3)
parcels.
7.

The Right of Way Contracts each contain an integration clause at ^5, which

states: "The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of this
agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said tract of land and shall
relieve [UDOT] of all further obligations or claims on that account, or on account of the location, grade and construction of the proposed highway."
8.

The Right of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an obligation for

UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the property.
9.

The Right of Way Contracts each contain reference at f6(A) to certain Warran-

ty Deeds, which conveyed the three (3) parcels to UDOT.
10. The referenced Warranty Deeds for one (1) of the three (3) parcels states in the
property's legal description: "An undivided ... interest in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway
Project]."
11. UDOT paid the Horman Family Trusts the agreed purchase price for the three
(3) parcels.
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12. On November 21, 2005, Hillcrest entered a Real Estate Purchase Contract for
the purchase of the Horman Family Trusts' remaining property located adjacent to the three
(3) parcels previously purchased by UDOT as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
13. The Real Estate Purchase Contract contains the following recital at 1J4: "Whereas, [the Horman Family Trusts are] desirous of selling the Property at a discounted price
that properly reflects the difficulties [Hillcrest] will encounter in developing and selling the
Property to independent third parties."
14. Throughout 2006 and 2007, UDOT exchanged correspondence with Hillcrest
and Centerville City regarding the construction of afrontageroad on the property purchased
as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Ultimately the frontage road was removed from the
plans for the Legacy Parkway Project and thefrontageroad was not constructed.
15. On October 28, 2008, Hillcrest delivered a letter to UDOTs executive director
regarding Hillcrest's claims, which attached a draft of Hillcrest's complaint in this action;
however, Hillcrest did not deliver a notice of its claims to the agent that UDOT has authorized to receive notices of claims against UDOT or the Office of the Attorney General prior
to initiating this action.
16. Hillcrest commenced this action on December 1, 2008.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Because disposition of a case on summary
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, any doubt concerning questions of fact,
including evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence, should be resolved
in favor of the opposing party." Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 P.2d 827, 831
(Utah 1989).
Here, UDOT seeks summary dismissal on each of Hillcrest's claims.

-5-

Ruling and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Case No. 080700723
Hillcrest's Contract Claims Against UDOT (Breach of Contract^ Declaratory Judgment,
and Specific Performance)
In order to survive summary dismissal of its breach of contract claim and contract
related claims, Hillcrest must show some evidence that a contract existed, that Hillcrest performed its obligations under the contract, that UDOT failed to perform under the contract,
and that Hillcrest was damaged by UDOTs failure to perform. See Bair v. Axiom Design,
LLC, 2001 UT 20, J14, 20 P.3d 388. UDOT contends that Hillcrest was not party to, or in
privity of, any contract with UDOT, and that even if a contract or privity exists, UDOT fully performed, as it was not obligated to construct a frontage road on the property purchased
from the Horman Family Trusts as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
"'As a general rule, none is liable upon a contract except those who are parties to
it.'" Shire Dev. v. Frontier Invs., 799 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting County of
Clark v. Bonanza No. 1, 615 P.2d 939, 943 (Nev. 1980)). "'It is axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in privity cannot sue on a contract.'" Id. (quoting Wing v. Martin, 688
P.2d 1172, 1177 (Idaho 1984)). Accordingly, "only parties to a contract, or intended beneficiaries thereof, have standing to sue [on a contract]." Id. at 222-23.3
Here, it is undisputed that Hillcrest was not a record titleholder of the properties
UDOT purchased from the Horman Family Trusts for the Legacy Parkway Project, was not
party to UDOTs condemnation action against the Horman Family Trusts, was not a party

"Third-party beneficiaries are persons who are recognized as having enforceable rights created in
them by a contract to which they are not parties and for which they give no consideration." SME
Indus., Inc. v. Thompson, Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs., Inc., 2001 UT 54, 1J47, 28 P.3d 669 (Internal
quotations omitted). "The existence of third party beneficiary status is determined by examining a
written contract." Wagner v. Clifton, 2002 UT 109, fll, 62 P.3d 440 (Internal quotations omitted).
"The written contract must show that the contracting parties clearly intended to confer a separate
and distinct benefit upon the third party." Id. (Internal quotations omitted). "Indeed, [the Utah Supreme Court] has stated that it is not enough that the parties to the contract know, expect or even
intend that others will benefit from the [contract].... The contract must be undertaken for the plaintiffs direct benefit and the contract itself must affirmatively make this intention clear." SME Indus.,
Inc., 2001 UT 54, f47 (Internal quotations omitted).
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to the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts, and did not
purchase the Horman Family Trusts' remaining adjacent property until several years after
UDOT and die Horman Family Trusts entered the Right of Way Contracts. Additionally,
the clear and unambiguous language within the Right of Way Contracts and Warranty
Deeds conveying the purchased property from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT contain
no reference to Hillcrest or any other potential third-party beneficiary. Accordingly, given
these facts and the plain language of the Right of Way Contracts and Warranty Deeds, the
Court must conclude as a matter of law that Hillcrest does not have standing to sue UDOT
on its contract claims, as Hillcrest was not a party to, or in privity of, UDOT's contracts
with the Horman Family Trusts.4
Moreover, even if Hillcrest was a party to, or in privity of, UDOT's contracts with
the Horman Family Trusts, the Court finds that UDOT was not obligated to pay for and
construct afrontageroad on the property purchased from the Horman Family Trusts for the
Legacy Parkway Project Specifically, UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman
Family Trusts contain a clear and unambiguous integration clause that indicates the document sets forth the parties' entire agreement. (See Right of Way Contracts, 1J5).5 The Right
of Way Contracts do not contain any reference to an affirmative or executory obligation of
UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the purchased property. (See generally

The fact that Hillcrest invested funds for the development of the Horman Family Trusts1 property
prior to UDOT's purchase of the property for the Legacy Parkway Project and subsequently purchased the Horman Family Trusts' remaining adjacent property is insufficient to demonstrate that
Hillcrest was in privity of contract or an intended third-party beneficiary of the contracts between
UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts. Further, Hillcrest has failed to present sufficient competent
evidence that it was a beneficiary of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, that the
Horman Family Trusts have assigned to Hillcrest any claims they may have against UDOT, or any
other evidence to establish a privity relationship with the Horman Family Trusts or UDOT.
"An integrated agreement is defined as a writing ... constituting afinalexpression of one or more
terms of an agreement. When a contract includes an integration clause, the contract is presumed to
contain the whole agreement and parties may not rely on extrinsic evidence in attempting to prove
that the contract is not integrated." City ofGrantsville v. Redev. Agency of Tooele City, 2010 UT 38,1|24,
233 P.3d 461 (Internal citations omitted).
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Id.). Further, while the Right of Way Contracts specifically reference the Warranty Deeds
that conveyed the purchased property from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT, and the
property's legal description within the Warranty Deeds refers to a general purpose "for a
frontage road incident to the construction of a freeway known as [the Legacy Parkway
Project,]" the Court finds that this language does not modify the parties' obligations set
forth in the Right of Way Contracts and does not create an additional obligation on the part
of UDOT to pay for and construct a frontage road on the purchased property. (See Id. at
1[6(A); see also Warranty Deeds). Rather, the plain language of the Warranty Deeds merely
reflects that the purchased property may be used for a frontage road incident to the Legacy
Parkway Project. (See Warranty Deeds). Accordingly, despite any representations made by
UDOT during initial negotiations and settlement negotiations with the Horman Family
Trusts, and subsequent correspondence with Hillcrest and Centerville City, the Court must
conclude as a matter of law that UDOT was not contractually obligated to pay for and construct afrontageroad on the property that it purchased from the Horman Family Trusts as
part of the Legacy Parkway Project. The Court, therefore, GRANTS UDOT's motion for
summary judgment as to Hillcrest's claims for breach of contract, declaratory judgment, and
specific performance.
Hillcrest's Fraudulent Inducement and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims
Hillcrest alleges that UDOTfraudulentlyinduced settlement of its condemnation action against the Horman Family Trusts by representing that it would pay for and construct a
frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. Hillcrest
further alleges that UDOT negligently misrepresented its intent and commitment to construct thefrontageroad as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
"The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, establishes the parameters under which
parties may bring suit against governmental entities for injuries.,, Greene v. Utah Transit
Auth., 2001 UT 109,1J10, 37 P.3d 1156. "Utah law mandates strict compliance with the re-
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quirements of the Immunity Act." Id. at \\2. Relevant to this case, the Act provides that a
notice of claim must be filed prior to the initiation of court action:
"Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority
shallfilea written notice ofclaim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless or whether or not the Junction giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental"
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(2) (Emphasis added). The Act further provides that "[t]he notice of claim shall be ... directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to the office of: ... (E) the attorney general, when the claim is
against the state; ... or (G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental entity under Subsection (5)(e)." Id. at § 63G-7401(3)(b)(ii)(E) & (G).6
"The primary purpose of a notice of claim requirement is to afford the responsible
public authorities an opportunity to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of
a claim and to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the expenditure
of public revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation.'" Brittain v. State by & through Utah
Dep't of Employment Sec, 882 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Stahl v. Utah
Transit Auth.% 618 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah 1980)). "Furthermore, filing notice of claim tends to
minimize the difficulties that may arise due to changes in administrations... [and] protects
against the passage of time obscuring memory and distorting a plaintiffs recollection of the
events which are at the heart of the claim." Id. (Internal citations omitted). Accordingly,
"the [Utah] supreme court has held the statutory notice requirement is a jurisdictional re-

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(5)(a) and (e): "Each governmental entity subject to suit
under [the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah] shallfilea statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce ... [and] may, in its statement,
identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept notices of claim on its behalf." Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-401(5)(a) & (e). UDOT has identified Shelley Exeter as its authorized agent to accept notices of claim on its behalf.
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quirement and a precondition to suit." Lamarr v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535,
540 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 250 (Utah 1988)).
Here, it is undisputed that Hillcrest did not deliver a notice of its claims against
UDOT to the Office of the Attorney General or the agent that UDOT has authorized to receive notices of claim prior to initiating this action. Further, while UDOT had actual notice
of Hillcrest1 s claims prior to the filing of Hillcrest's complaint by virtue of the October 28,
2008 letter Hillcrest delivered to UDOTs executive director, "the [Utah] supreme court has
indicated that actual notice cannot cure a failure to comply with the notice provisions of the
Governmental Immunity Act." Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 541 (citing Varoz v. Sevey, 506 P.2d 435,
436 (Utah 1973)). Accordingly, the Court must conclude that it is without jurisdiction to
hear Hillcrest's fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims against
UDOT.
Additionally, even if Hillcrest had strictly complied with the notice of claim requirement of the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah, Hillcrest's claims for fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation are fundamentally flawed. Specifically, Hillcrest's
complaint alleges that it sold property to UDOT at a reduced cost based upon UDOT's representations that it would pay for and construct a frontage road across the purchased property as part of the Legacy Parkway Project. (See Complaint, 1ffl45-60). However, Hillcrest
did not convey any property to UDOT to support these allegations. Rather, the undisputed
facts show that Hillcrest was not a record tideholder of the property that UDOT purchased
from the Horman Family Trusts and was not a party to UDOT's condemnation action
against the Horman Family Trusts.7 Moreover, the Court has found that Hillcrest was not

Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Hillcrest purchased the Horman Family Trusts' remaining adjacent property several years after UDOT purchased the property for the Legacy Parkway
Projectfromthe Horman Family Trusts. (See Real Estate Purchase Contract). At the time of this
purchase, it was uncertain whether afrontageroad would be included in UDOTs plans for the Legacy Parkway Project. In fact, Hillcrest purchased the remaining adjacent property at a discounted
price, which reflected the difficulties Hillcrest would encounter in developing and selling the property to independent third parties. (See Id. at Recital 1[4).
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party to the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts, was
not in privity of contract or an intended third-party beneficiary of the Right of Way Contracts, and that Hillcrest has not presented sufficient evidence to establish that it was a beneficiary of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, or that the Horman Family
Trusts assigned Hillcrest any claims that they may have against UDOT. Accordingly, given
the undisputed facts in this matter and the Court's rulings on Hillcrest's contract related
claims, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that Hillcrest cannot succeed on its fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation claims. The Court, therefore, GRANTS
UDOT's motion for summary judgment as to Hillcrest's claims for fraudulent inducement
and negligent misrepresentation.
Hillcrest's Unjust Enrichment Claim
Hillcrest complains that UDOT has been unjustly enriched and that equity necessitates recovery for the reduced purchase price and severance damages that UDOT received
when it purchased the property from the Horman Family Trusts upon representing that it
would pay for and construct afrontageroad on the property.
"A claim for unjust enrichment is an action brought in restitution, and a prerequisite
for recovery on an unjust enrichment theory is the absence of an enforceable contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties relating to the conduct at issue." Ashby v.
Ashby, 2010 UT 7, ^14, 227 P.3d 246. "If there were a contract, it, rather than the law of restitution, would govern the parties' rights and determine their recovery." Id. "Recovery under [unjust enrichment] presupposes that no enforceable written or oral contract exists." Id.
(Internal quotations omitted).
Here, the Court has found that no enforceable contract exists between Hillcrest and
UDOT. Nevertheless, to succeed on its claim for unjust enrichment, Hillcrest must establish
three elements:
"First, there must be a benefit conferred by one person on another. Second the
conferee must appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. Third, there must
be acceptance or retention by the conferee of the benefit under such circums-11-
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tances as to make it inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without
payment of its value."
Allen v. Hall, 2006 UT 70, ^26, 148 P.3d 939. It is undisputed that Hillcrest was never a
record titieholder of the property UDOT purchased from the Horman Family Trusts as part
of the Legacy Parkway Project, and that Hillcrest did not purchase the Horman Family
Trusts' remaining adjacent property until several years after UDOT and the Horman Family
Trusts entered the Right of Way Contracts. Under these facts, the Court cannot find that
Hillcrest ever conferred a benefit on UDOT to support Hillcrest's claim for unjust enrichment. Additionally, Hillcrest has presented no evidence to establish that it was a beneficiary
of, or successor entity to, the Horman Family Trusts, or that the Horman Family Trusts
have assigned to Hillcrest any claims they may have against UDOT. Regardless, however,
the Court has found that the Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman
Family Trusts do not contain any affirmative or executory obligation for UDOT to pay for
and construct a frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway
Project. Accordingly, the Court must conclude as a matter of law that UDOT did not receive a benefit for which it did not compensate the Horman Family Trusts upon its performance under the Right of Way Contracts. The Court, therefore, GRANTS UDOT's motion
for summary judgment as to Hillcrest's unjust enrichment claim.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Right of Way Contracts between UDOT and the Horman Family Trusts

are fully integrated and contain the parties' entire agreement.
2.

The Right of Way Contracts and Warranty Deeds between UDOT and the

Horman Family Trusts are clear and unambiguous.
3.

Hillcrest does not have standing to assert its contract claims against UDOT, as

Hillcrest was not a party to any contract with UDOT, and was not in privity of contract or
an intended third-party beneficiary of UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman
Family Trusts.
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4.

UDOT's Right of Way Contracts with the Horman Family Trusts do not con-

tain any obligation, executory or otherwise, requiring UDOT to pay for and construct a
frontage road on the property purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
5.

The Warranty Deeds conveying the purchased property for the Legacy Park-

way Project from the Horman Family Trusts to UDOT do not modify UDOT's obligations
under the Right of Way Contracts, and do not create an additional obligation for UDOT to
pay for and construct a frontage road on the property.
6.

UDOT performed its obligations under the Right of Way Contracts with the

Horman Family Trusts.
7.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over Hillcrest's fraudulent inducement and negli-

gent misrepresentation claims against UDOT, as Hillcrest failed to deliver the requisite notice of claim in accordance with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
8.

UDOT's actual notice of Hillcrest's claims prior to the filing of Hillcrest's com-

plaint does not cure Hillcrest's failure to comply with the notice of claim requirement of the
Governmental Immunity Act of Utah.
9.

Even if Hillcrest had complied with the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah's

notice of claim requirement, Hillcrest was not the record titleholder of, and could not convey, the property UDOT purchased from the Horman Family Trusts as part of the Legacy
Parkway Project, and therefore, Hillcrest cannot establish the necessary elements to support
its claims offraudulentinducement and negligent misrepresentation.
10. Hillcrest did not confer a benefit upon UDOT for purposes of Hillcrest's unjust
enrichment claim, and UDOT did not unjusdy receive a benefit from the Horman Family
Trusts, as UDOT was not obligated to pay for and construct a frontage road on the property
purchased as part of the Legacy Parkway Project.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that UDOT's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
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IT IS FURTHER HEREBY ORDERED that as a consequence of this ruling, all
other pending motions are rendered moot.
This Ruling shall also constitute the Court's Order in this matter; no separate order is

D

necessary or required.
Date signed:
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f

2011,1 sent a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Ruling and Order to the parties as follows:
Randy S. Hunter

OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 5* Floor
P.O. Box 140857
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0857
Thomas L. Van Wyngarden
Adelaide Maudsley
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER, LLP
201 South Main Street, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Pn&lutCourt Clerk
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
RIGHT OF WAY CONTRACT

h. No. 70004
Project Name:

PPMSPinNo.

1793

Region No. 2

Legacy Parkway - So. Davis Co.

Project No. SP-0067(1)0

Parcel No. 173:A, 173, j73iC_

The Namroh Trust, The Phares T Horman Family Trust, The SCV Horman Familty Trust,
The Theodore & Birdie Horman Family Trust Grantor(s) of

Date:

No. See Below Warranty deed(s) for a tract of land for transportation purposes over property described in said deed will be delivered to
David J. West, SRAVA Acquisition Agent, as escrow agent, with instructions to deliver said deed(s) to the Utah Department of Transportation,
3ox 148420, 4501 South 2700 West, 4* Floor South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8420, upon the delivery to said escrow agent, for the undersigned
jrantor(s) of a copy of this agreement, properly executed and approved by the Utah Department of Transportation.
IN CONSIDERATION of the foregoing, and other considerations hereinafter set forth it is mutually agreed by the parties hereto as.
bllows:
1. Said tract of land is grantedfreeand clear. All liens and encumbrances and partial releases for said tract of land shall be furnished to the Utah Department of
Transportation, and the total amount in cash settlement shall be paid to the grantor except such portion thereof, as the grantor may assign to a lien holder in obtaining the
partialreleases.
2. All work done under this agreement, shall conform to all applicable building,fireand sanitary laws, ordinances and regulations relating to such work, and
shall be done in a good and workmanlike manner.
3. All structures, improvements, or other facilities when removed and relocated or reconstructed, shall be left in as good condition as found.
4. No work, improvement, alteration or maintenance will be done or made other than or in addition to that provided in this agreement.
5. The parties have here set out the whole of their agreement. The performance of this agreement constitutes the entire consideration for the grant of said tract
of land and shall relieve the Utah Department of Transportation of all further obligations or claims on that account, or on account of the location, grade and construction of
the proposed highway.
6. If and when possession is taken by it of the said tract of land(s) hereinabove referred to, the Utah Department of
transportation shall comply with the following:
William R. Horman, Rhys Horman & Kenneth Erickson, trustees of the NAMROH TRUST,
(an und. 23.445410% int.)
Pharas T. Horman, Jr., Kevin Ririe & Kenneth L. Spurlock, trustees of the PHARES T. HORMAN FAMILY
TRUST (an und. 23.079810%)
-les H. Horman, trustee of the SCV HORMAN FAMILY TRUST; (an und. 30.139510%)
. .iinis Horman, trustee of the THEODORE AND BIRDIE HORMAN FAMILY TRUST; (an und.
23.335270% int.)
i)

Pay Cash in full to the grantor(s) for the following:
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173: A
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173
Land as described in Warranty Deed No. 0067:173: C

$1,933,905.00

7. Grantor agrees to pay any and all taxes assessed against this property to date of closing.
sessed a g a i n s t t h e Property t o t h e d a t e of
2-time i n

closing

l i e u f e e payments t h a t may b e r e q u i r e d ,

Utah Code Ann* g \ 5 9 - 2 - 5 1 1 ,

All

However J a l l t a x e s
any r o l l b a c f k t a x e s o r any
a s d e s c r i b e d Total Cash Settlement $1,933,905.00
shall

not include

r o l l b a c k t a x e s a n d any o n e - t i m e i n

l i e u f e e p; [yinents s h a l l

be

Ld i n

f u l l s o l e l y b y t h e Utah Department o f T r a n s p o r t a t i o n .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this agreement the day and year first above written. It is understood that this is only an option until
proved by the Utah Department of Transportation.
TAH D E P A R T M E N T O F TRANSPORTATION
conunended'for Approva

i J>LiJ~-

£L-UO^^
AX^A&^

/ t CyAju^ux^
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o
o
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o
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APPROVAL OF CONSTRUCTION ITEMS:
By_

Q

D
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Utah Department of Transportation
Right of Way, Fourth Floor
Box 148420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8420

Warranty Deed
• .

(TRUSTEE)
Parcel No. 0067:173:C
"•••••'
Davis County
Project No. SP-0067 (1)0
WILLIAM R.HORMAN, RHYS HORMAN AND KENNETH- ERICKSON, AS TRUSTEES
OF THE NAMROH TRUST
•
_ _ _ _ , Grantor^
•nf SALT LAKE CITY
hereby

County of SALT LAKE

CONVEY AND

450.1 South

2700

WARRANT

West,

Salt

to

state of UTAH

the UTAH DEPARTMENT OF

Lake

City, Utah

,

TRANSPORTATION, at-

84119, Grantee, for

of ($10.00) TEN DOLLARS-AMD' OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE-CONSIDERATION

the sua

,. -Dollars,

and other good and valuable considerations, the following described parcel of land
in. Davis County,' State of Utah, to-wit:
23.445410%

An undivided ffl?f ffijyqytf* interest in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage
road incident/ to the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 0067,
being part of' an entire tract of property, situate in the SEMSEtf of Section 36;
T. 3 N-, R. 1 W., S.L.B. & M., and in the NE}*SEM,- the , SE^NEK, and Lot 1 of
Section' 1, T. 2 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B. & M., The boundaries of said parcel of land are
described as follows:
Beginning iri the northerly boundary line of said entire tract at a point
35.700 m (117.13 ft.) perpendicularly distant westerly from the.right of way control
line of said project, which point is approximately 19.289 m (63.28 ft.)
3, 99f.4l'f33'* W (deed of record (S 89°41,10" W) , 111.944 m (367.27 ft.) N a°X6'53n B
"(d^ed-.of record N 0°15f01" E) and 103.159 ra (338.45. ft.) N 89°51'43» W (deed of
record N 89o53,10l, W) from the Southeast corner of said Section 36, which corner
lies 11.125 m (36.50 ft) S 89041,33" W (deed of record S as^l'lO" W) from the
marked witness corner; and running thence S 0o16,42!, W 1,119.496 m (3,672.89 ft.)
to a point of tangency with a 599.300 m (1,966.21 ft.) radius curve to the right;
thence Southerly 213.002 m (698.83 ft.), more or less, along the arc of said curve
(a non-concentric curve to the highway control line) to the southerly boundary fence
line of said entire tract (Note: Chord to said curve-bears S 10o27f37rt W for a
distance of 211.883 m 695.15 ft.)); thence N 89°57f23n W (deed of record
N'88°56,56M W) 236.296 m (775.25. ft.) , more or less, along said southerly boundary
fence line to the west line of said NEMSEtf; thence N 0°00,06n W (deed of record
North) 29.509 m (96.81 ft.) along said west line; thence. S 89°59,14lf E 219.381 m
(719.75 ft.) to a point 61.565 m (201.98-ft.) radially distant westerly from said
right of-way control line; thence Northerly 183.716 m (602.74 ft.) along the. arc of
a. 572.700 m (1,,878.94 ft.) radius curve to the left (a non-concentric curve to the .
highway control line) (Note: Chord to said curve bears N 9°28l06? E for a distance
of 182.929 m (600.16 ft.)); thence N 0°16,42,f E 28.008 m. (91.89 ft.); thence
N 45°q0,0Q" E 5.684 m. (18.65 ft.); thence N 0°16f42rt E 1,085.804.m (3,562.35 ft.),
more, or less, to said northerly boundary line; thence S 89°51'43" E (deed of record .
S *89Q53,10lf E) 21.300 m (69.88 ft.)', more or less, along said northerly boundary.,
iine to the point of beginning as shown on the official map of said project on.file
in the office of the Utah Department of Transportation* The above described parcelof' land contains 35,766.2 sguare meters (8.838 acres), more or. less.
|| {
f . noofi
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Together with any and all water rights appurtenant to the above described
parcel of land

3L V^

•WITNESS, the hand_ of said Grantor_, this
of

FEBRUARY

THE NAMROH TRUST

Signed in the presence of:

^
BY:
STATE OF

aay

, A.D. 2002 .

^^ll^A^^^

WILLIAM R. HORMAN, TRUSTEE

)

UTAH

) ss.
COUNTY OF
On

)

SALT LAKE

the

date

first

above

BY:
\ written

KENNETH ERICKSON, TRI
TRUSTEE
personally appeared
before me',

WILLIAM R. HORMAN, RHYS HORtiAN AND KENNETH ERICKSON AS TRUSTEES OF.THE NAMROH TRUST
who,

being by/me duly sworn, acknowledged to me that TheY. signed the within and

foregoing instrument in accordance with the authority as Trustees^ given under the
.„ m
_
. •_ _ WILLIAM R- HORMAN, RHYS HORMAN
instrument creatxng said Trust, and that - ^ ^ ^ j ^ E R I C K S 0N
as Trustee^ jjie_y executed the same.

r

gjtfurtM

i
i
i

Notary Public

L

'"I
•WO South 900 Ettt #290

0?loh,,

ofts?

BW»o<l

I
I
I

m
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Utah Department of Transportation
Right of Way, Fourth Floor
Box 148420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8420

Warranty Deed
(TRUSTEE)
Davis County

Parcel No. 0067:173:0.
Project No. SP-OO67(l)0

PHARES T HORMAN JR., AND KENNETH L. SPURLOCK, AS TRUSTEES OF
THE. PHARES: T...:HQRKAN' EAMILY TRUST
;
;
:
SALT LAKE CITY

of

hereby
4501
nf;

CONVEY

AND

South- 270 0

County of
WARRANT
West,.

Salt

to

SALT LAKE
the

Lake

UTAH
City,

_,

State of

DEPARTMENT. OF
Utah

•

84119,.

Grant ois.,

UTAH

,

TRANSPORTATION,
Grantee,

($10.00) TEN. DOLLARS AND,. OTHER. GQ0P AND, VALIJABLE .CONSIDERATION

for

at

the sum
.Dollars,.,

and other good and valuable considerations, the following described parcel of land
in Davis County, State of Utah, to-wit:
An undivided 23.079810% interest in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage
iroad incident to the construction of a freeway, known as Project No. 0067,
being part of an entire tract of property, situate . in the SE^SEM of Section 36,
T;. 3 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B. & M., and in the NEMSE**, the SWyW&A, and Lot 1 of
Section 1, T. 2 N., R. 1 W., S.L..B. & M., The boundaries of said parcel of land are
described as follows:
Beginning in the northerly boundary line of said entire tract at a point
35*1700 m (117T13 ft.) perpendicularly distant westerly.from the right of way control
line.; of said project, which point is approximately 19.289 m
(63.28 ft.)
Sv89f41,33M W (deed of record (S 89°41,10» W) , 111.944 m (367.27 ft.) N 0o16,53» E
'Cdeed of record N 0 o 15 f 01" E) and 103.159 m (338.45 ft.) N 89°51 , 43 M W (deed of
record N 89°53,10,f W) from the Southeast corner of said Section 36, which, corner
lies 11.125 m (36.50 ft) S 89°41'33" W (deed of record S 89°41'10» W) from the
marked witness corner; and running thence S 0°16f42".W 1,119.496 m (3,672.89 ft.)
to a point of tangency with a 599.300 m (1,966.21 ft.) radius curve to the right;
thence Southerly 213.002 m (698.83 ft.), more or less, along the arc of said curve
(a non-concentric curve to the highway control line) to the southerly boundary fence
line of said entire tract (Note: Chord to said curve bears S 10°27 l 37" W for a
distance of 211.883 m 695.15 ft.)); thence N- 89t,57,23" W (deed* of record
N 88?56f56" W) 236.296 m (775.25 ft.), more or less, along said southerly boundary
fence line to the west line of said NEtfSEM; thence N 0°00,06". W (deed of record
North) 29.509 m (96.81 ft.) along said west line; thence S 89°59 , 14" E 219.381 ra
(719.75 ft.) to a.point 61.565 ra (201.98 ft.) radially.distant westerly from said'
.right of way control line; thence Northerly 183.716 m (602.74; ft.) along the arc of
a 572.7.00 m (l/878.94 ft.) radius curve to the left (a non-concentric curve-to the
highway contrbl line) (Note: Chord to said curve bears N 9°28,06tl E for. a distance
of 182.929 m (600.16 ft.)); thence.N 0°16f42" E 28.008 m (91.89 ft.); thence
N 45°00,00tl E 5.684 m (18.65 ft.); thence N 0°16f42H E 1,085.804 m (3,562.35 ft.),
jtiore<or less, to said northerly boundary line; thence S 89°51 , 43 M E (deed of record
S: '89o53,10l, E) 21.300 m (69.88 ft.), more or less, along said northerly boundary
line to the point of beginning as shown on the official map of said project on file
in the office of the Utah Department of Transportation. The above described parcel
of land contains 35,766.2 square meters (8.838 acres), more or less.
uii i np<fc
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u
T o g e t h e r w i t h any and a l l w a t e r r i g h t s appurtenant t o t h e above described
p a r c e l of l a n d

*tk
WITNESS, the hands, of said Grantors., this
of

FEBRUARY

day

, A.D. 20 02.

Signed in the presence of:

THE F

)RMAN FAMILY TRUST
TRUSTEE

STATE OF

UTAH
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On the

date

)
first

above

* written

personally

PHARES T. HORMAN JR. .AND KENNETH L. SPURLOCK AS TRUSTEES
—

—

7

:

'

-

•

;

appeared

before me,
' •'

,

~

who, being by me duly sworn, acknowledged to me that the_y signed the within and
foregoing instrument in accordance with the authority as Trustees, given under the
.
.
.V- „; _•
•* -u „
PHARES T. HORMAN AND
KENNETH L. SPURLOCK
instrument creating.-, saxd Trust, and that
as Trustees. the_y executed the same.

Notary Public

HILL 081 &

<s

WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO:
Utah Department of Transportation
Right of Way, Fourth Floor
Box 148420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8420

Warranty Deed
(TRUSTEE)
Davis County

Parcel No. 0067:173:C2
Project No. SP-0067 (1)'0

CHARLES H. HORMAN, AS, TRUSTEE OF THE SCV HORMAN FAMILY TRUST
of

SALT LAKE CITY

hereby
4501

CONVEY
South

County of SALT LAKE

AND

2700

WARRANT

West,

Salt

to

the

Lake

UTAH
City,

Grantor.,,

, State of
DEPARTMENT
Utah

OF

UTAH

TRANSPORTATION,

841.19, Grantee,

for

pf ($10,00) TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD'AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

at

the sum
Dollars,

and other good and valuable considerations-, the following described parcel of land
in Davis County, State of Utah, to-wit:

•

, .

;• V* ; Ad undivided 30.139510% interest in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage
road' incident to the construction of a freeway known as Project No. 0067,
being part of an entire tract of property, situate in the SEMSEM of .Section 36,
T, 3- N. , R. 1 W., S.L.B. & M., and in the NEMSEM/" the SE**NEM, and Lot 1 of
Section 1, T. 2 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B. & M., The boundaries of said parcel of land are
described as follows:
Beginning in the northerly boundary line of said entire tract at a point
35.700 m (117.13 ft.) perpendicularly distant westerly from the right of way control
line of said, project, which, point is approximately 19.289 m (63.28 ft.)
S. 89°41,33M W (deed, of record (S 89°41l10» W) , 111.944 m (367.27 ft.) N 0o16,53» B
(deed of record N 0oi5f01,f E) and 103.159 m (338.45 ft.) N 89°51,43n W (deed of
record N 89°53 , 10" W) from the Southeast corner of said Section 36, which corner
lies. 11.125 m (36.50 ft) S 89°41f33" W (deed of record S 89°41,10" W). from the
marked witness corner; and running thence S O 0 ^ ^ " W 1,119.496 m (3,672^89 ft.)
to a point of tangency with a 599.300 m (1,966.21 ft.) radius curve to the right;
thence Southerly 213.002 m (698.83 ft.), more or less, along the arc of said curve
(a non-concentric curve to the highway control line) to the southerly boundary fence
line pf said entire tract (Note: Chord to said curve bears S 10°27,37" W for a
aistance" of ":21i.883 ' m 695:15 ft.))'; thence N 89-657,23»". W ~ (deed of" record*
.N : 88 0 56 f 56 M W) 236.296 m (775.25 ft.), more or less, along said southerly boundaryfence line to the we»st line of said NEKSEM; thence N 0°00,06w W (deed of record
North) 29.509 m (96.81 ft.) along said west line; thence S 89°59,14" E 219.381 m
(719.75 ft.) to a point 61.565 m (201.98 ft.) radially distant westerly from said
right of way control line; thence Northerly 183.716 ra (602.74 ft.) along the,arc of
a 572-700 m (1/878.94 ft.) radius curve to the left (a non-concentric curve to the
highway control line) (Note: Chord to said .curve bears N 9o28f06H E for a distance
of 182,929 m (600.16 ft.)); thence • N 0°16,42" E 28.008 m (91.89 ft.); thence
N.45°00,00" E 5.684 m. (18.65 ft.); thence N 0°16l42,f E 1,085.804 ra (3,562.35 ft.) ,
more or less, to said-northerly boundary line; thence S 89051l43l, E (deed of record
S «9°53 l 10 n E) 21.300 m (69.88.ft.), more or less, along said northerly boundary
line to the point of beginning as shown on the official map of said project "oil file
in the office of the Utah Department of Transportation. The above described parcel
of land contains 35,766.2 square meters (8.838 acres), more'or less.

HILL 0835
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Parcel No. 0067:173:C2
Project No. SP-OO67(l)0

Together with any and all water rights appurtenant to the above described
parcel of land

WITNESS, the hand_ of said Grantor.., this
of

[

FEBRUARY

£

;

day

, A.D. 2002 .

Signed in the presence of:

THE SCV HORMAN FAMILY TRUST
BY: CHARLES H. HORMAN, TRUSTEE

STATE OF

UTAH

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
On

the

date

)
first

above

-written

personally

appeared

before

':,

CHARLES H. HORMAN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE. SCV. HORMAN FAMILY TRUST •
who, being by me duly sworn, acknowledged to me that

me,

_he_ : signed the within and

foregoing instrument in accordance with the authority as Trustee^ given under the
instrument
as Trustee

klr/ylr.

creating

said

Trust,

and

he * executed the same.*

Notary Eublic

that

. CHARLES.H; HORMAN
"••••'il'^i••••••*•••• •••l

U---.-.,. . .

^

^

\J\p

WHEN RECORDED. MAIL TO:
Utah Department of Transportation
Right of Way, Fourth Floor
Box 148420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-8420

Warranty Deed
(TRUSTEE)
Davis County

Parcel No. 0067:173:C3
Project No. SP~OQ67(1)0

DENNIS HORMAN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE THEODORE AND BIRDlE HORMAN FAMILY TRUST Grantor.,
bf

SALT LAKE CITY

hereby

CONVEY. AND

4501' South
rtf

County of

2700

WARRANT

West,

Salt

to

SALT LAKE
the

Lake

UTAH
City,

State of
DEPARTMENT
Utah

84119,

OF

UTAH

,

TRANSPORTATION,

Grantee,

($1.0.00) TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION

for

at

the sun
Dollars,

• arid other good and valuable considerations", the following described parcel of land
in.-Davis County, State of Utah, to-wit:
An undivided 23.335270% interest in a parcel of land in fee for a frontage
road incident to the construction of a freeway known as Project No, 0067,
being part of an entire tract of property,, situate in the SEMSEM of Section 36,
T'. 3' N-, R. 1 W., S.L.B. & M. , and in the NE^SEtf, the SE^NEtf, and Lot 1 of
Section 1, T. 2 N., R. 1 W., S.L.B. & M., The boundaries of said parcel of land are
described as follows:
Beginning in the northerly boundary line o£ said entire tract at a point
35.700 m (117.13 ft.) perpendicularly distant westerly from the right of way control
iine- of said project, which point is approximately 19.289 m (63.28 ft.)
$\89°41,33" W (deed of record (S 89°41,10" W) # 111.944 ra (367.27 ft.) N 0 o 16 f 53 M B
"(defcd of record N 0 o 15 , 01 n E) and 103.159 m (3.38.45 ft.) N 89°51l43" W (deed of
record N 89o53'10n W) from the Southeast corner of said.Section 36, which corner
lies 11.125 m (36.50 ft) S 89°41,33" W (deed of record S 89°41,10lf W) from the
marked witness corner; and running thence S 0°16,42ff W 1,119^496 m (3,672.89 ft.)
to?a point of tangency with a 599.300 m (1,966.21 ft.) radius curve to the right;
thence Southerly .2131.002 m .. (698.83 ft.), more or less, along the arc of said curve
(a non-concentric curve to the highway control line) to the southerly boundary fence
line of said entire tract (Note: Chord to said curve bears S 10°27,37n W for a
distance of 2.11.883 m 695.15 ft.)); thence N 89°57f23» W (deed of record
N 88°56,56lf W) 236.296 m (775.25 ft.), more or less, along said southerly boundaryfence line to the west line of said NE^SEM; thence N 0°00*06" W (deed of record
North) 29.509 m (96.81 ft.) along said-west line; thence S 89°59l14w E 219.381 in
(719.75 ft.) to a point 61.565 m (201.98 ft.) radially distant westerly from said
right of way control line;-thence Northerly 183.716 m (602.74 ft.) along the arc of
a 572.700 m (1,878.94 ft.) radius curve to the left (a non-concentric curve to the
highway control line) (Note: Chord to said curve bears N 9.°2Bl0Sn E for a distance
of. 182.929 m (600.16 ft.)); thence N 0°16,42n E 28.008 m (91.89 ft.); thence
N 45°00,00» E 5.684 m (18.65 ft.); thence N 0°16f42" E 1,085.804 m (3,562.35 ft.),
moire or iess, to said northerly boundary line; thence S 89°51'43" E (deed of record
S :89°53l10!l E) 21.300 m (69.88 ft.), more or less, along said northerly boundary
iine to the point of beginning as shown on the official map of said project on file
in-the office of the Utah Department of Transportation. The above described parcel
of • iand contains 35,766.2 square meters (8.838 acres), more or less.

HILL 0844
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Together with any and all water rights appurtenant to the above described
parcel, of land

2+K

WITNESS, the hand_ of said Grantor_, this
of . FEBRUARY

;

, A.D. 20 02,

Signed in the presence of:

day
FAMILY TRUSffl

THE T
BY:, DENNIS HORMAN,. TRUSTEE

STATE OF

)

UTAH

) ss.
COUNTY OF

)

SALT LAKE

On the date

first

above

written

personally

appeared

before me,

DENNIS HORMAN, AS TRUSTEE OF THE THEODORE AND BIRDIE HORMAN FAMILY TRUST

,

who, being by me duly sworn, acknowledged to me that _he_ signed the within and
foregoing instrument in accordance with the authority as Trustee^ given under the
instrument

creating

said

Trust,

and that

as-Trustee... _ h e — executed the same.

hsluurt' Ma^u^iM
Notary Public

BENNIS HORMAN
a NoteryPubtto
NICOLE LEAVITT
•320 8outh 900 E a t M M
• M U f e C t t y . U r S41l7

'Octob^e.200*
State of Utah

'"I

•

I
I

&
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Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2007 WL 2505634 (Tex.App.-Eastland)
(Cite as: 2007 WL 2505634 (Tex.App.-Eastland))

H
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
SEE TX R RAP RULE 47.2 FOR DESIGNATION
AND SIGNING OF OPINIONS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Court of Appeals of Texas,
Eastland.
Clovis WAKEFIELD, Appellant
v.
Joyce PHILLIPS and the E.A. Ohlenbusch Trust,
Marilyn Kensing and Louise Genz, Trustees, Appellees.
No. 11-06-00066-CV.
Sept. 6,2007.
On Appeal from the 32nd District Court, Fisher
County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 5809, Glen
Harrison, Judge.
Jack W. Cunningham, Steve R. Campos, Henslee,
Fowler, Hepworth & Schwartz, LLP, Austin, for appellant.
Peter F. Sheridan, Griggs & Sheridan, Sweetwater,
for appellees.
Panel consists of: WRIGHT, C.J., McCALL. J., and
STRANGE. J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JIM R. WRIGHT. Chief Justice.
*1 In his will, Ernest A. Ohlenbusch created a
trust for the benefit of his wife, Martha H. Ohlenbusch. The trust came into existence upon the death
of Mr. Ohlenbusch and terminated upon the death of
Mrs. Ohlenbusch. Mr. Ohlenbusch died on September 19, 1994, and Mrs. Ohlenbusch died on January
14,2003.
On February 18, 2004, Joyce Phillips and the
E.A. Ohlenbusch Trust, through its named trustees
Marilyn Kensing and Louise Genz filed this lawsuit
against Clovis Wakefield to partition approximately
363 acres of land in Fisher County. Later, Phillips,
Kensing, Genz, and Wakefield entered into an agreed
order of sale that was then entered by the trial court.
On November 3, 2005, Stan Edwards, the receiver

appointed by the court in the agreed order, sold the
property; he filed a report of the sale that same day.
Before the sale could be confirmed, Wakefield fired
her lawyer and filed a pro se amended answer in
which she raised various matters not raised in earlier
pleadings.— On November 30, 2005, the trial court
conducted a hearing regarding confirmation of the
sale. Wakefield appeared at the hearing pro se. On
December 16, 2005, the trial court entered a decree
confirming the sale. We modify and affirm.
FN1. Wakefield is represented by counsel in
this appeal.
In her first issue on appeal, Wakefield argues
that the decree confirming the sale was "invalid as a
matter of law" because the trustees did not have
standing to bring the suit. She next argues, in her
second issue on appeal, that the decree confirming
the sale was "invalid as a matter of law" because the
trial court failed to require joinder of all of the owners of the property. Finally, in her third issue on appeal, Wakefield maintains that the trial court abused
its discretion in confirming the sale because the receiver did not sell the entire interest in the property.
Standing is an issue that can be raised at any
time because it is a part of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Tex. Ass'n of Bus, v. Tex. Air Control Bd, 852
S.W.2d 440, 445-46 (Tex. 1993). For a party to have
standing, there must be an actual controversy between the parties in the lawsuit that actually will be
determined by the relief sought in it. Austin Nursing
Ctr.. Inc. v. Lovato. 171 S.W.3d 845. 850 (Tex.2005\
Capacity, however, is an issue that must be raised by
a verified pleading or it is waived. TEX.R. CIV. P.
93(1\ (2V. Spurgeon v. Coan & Elliott. 180 S.W.3d
593, 597 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2005. no pet.V
A party must have both standing and capacity to
bring a lawsuit. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d at 848:
Spurgeon. 180 S.W.3d at 597. The focus in a standing issue is upon the question of whether the party
bringing the lawsuit has a sufficient relationship with
it so that there is a justiciable interest in the outcome.
Lovato, 171 S.W .3d 848; Spurgeon. 180 S.W.3d at
597. Standing exists if the party bringing the lawsuit
is personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong.
Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist..
925 S.W.2d 659. 661 (Tex. 1996). Capacity is procedural in nature, and the focus in a capacity inquiry is
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upon the personal qualifications of a party to litigate.
Id. A party may lack standing because that party does
not have a justiciable interest in the outcome of a
case but yet have capacity when the party has the
legal authority to act. Id. We review standing questions de novo. Mavhew v. Town of Sunnyvale. 964
S.W.2d 922. 928 (Tex. 1998).
*2 Wakefield correctly argues that the trust terminated upon the death of Mrs. Ohlenbusch. TEX.
PROP.CODE ANN. S 112.052 (Vernon 2007): see
Sorrel v. Sorrel. 1 S.W.3d 867. 871 (Tex.App.Corpus Christi 1999. no pet). She is also correct that
the legal title held by the trustees and the equitable
title held by the beneficiaries merged in the beneficiaries at that time.— Id. Phillips was one of those
beneficiaries. Wakefield does not question that Phillips has both standing and capacity in this lawsuit.
Regardless of whether Kensing and Genz have standing, Phillips, as an owner of the property, would have
standing to bring a suit to partition the property. See
TEX. PROP.CODE ANN. S 23.001 (Vernon 2000).
Further, Wakefield admits that Kensing and Genz are
beneficiaries of the trust in their individual capacities.
As beneficiaries of the trust, Phillips, Kensing, and
Genz each have a sufficient relationship with the
lawsuit so that there is a justiciable interest in the
outcome. See Lovato. Ill S.W.3d at 848. Phillips,
Kensing, and Genz each have standing in this lawsuit.
FN2. Wakefield relies on Sorrel also for the
proposition that there can be no judicial partition in cases of this nature. Sorrel is distinguishable. In Sorrel, the attempted partition
was nonjudicial. The trustees there attempted to partition the property by direct
conveyance. Moreover, even if the trial
court could not partition the property at the
request of the trustees, it could partition the
property at the request of Phillips. That
proposition has not been questioned either in
the trial court or in this court.
While couched as standing issues, Wakefield's
position is more in the nature of an attack on the capacity of Kensing and Genz to bring this suit for partition. Complaints regarding a party's capacity must
be raised timely by verified pleading. Rule 93(1). (2).
Wakefield filed a verified pleading in which she
raised the issue of capacity. However, the trial court

had entered its agreed order for the sale of the property, the receiver had sold the property, and he had
filed a report of the sale before Wakefield raised the
issue of capacity in an amended answer. The trial
court held that the issue was not timely raised. We
agree. By waiting until after the report of the sale had
been filed, Wakefield did not raise the issue of capacity timely, and she waived it. See Ray Maloolv Trust
v. Juki. 186 S.W.3d 568. 570 (Tex.2006). Wakefield'sfirstissue on appeal is overruled.
Wakefield next maintains that the decree confirming the sale is invalid because the trial court did
not require the joinder of all joint owners of the property. In various pleadings and in numerous arguments
to the trial court and to this court, Wakefield states
that there are other owners of the property who were
not joined in the lawsuit. However, Wakefield offered nothing in the way of actual evidence or testimony regarding these other owners. While there may
well be other owners, the trial court was presented
with nothing beyond unsworn declarations and arguments regarding such other possible owners. The
only actual evidence that the trial court had before it
was that the property was owned one-third by Phillips, one-third by the trust, and one-third by Wakefield. However, because the trust had terminated and
because the legal and equitable titles to the property
had merged into the beneficiaries, as a matter of law,
ownership of the one-third interest attributed to the
trust should have been attributed to the beneficiaries
of the trust. We will modify that portion of the judgment of the trial court to show that the one-third interest attributed to the trust is owned by the beneficiaries of the trust. Otherwise, Wakefield's second issue
on appeal is overruled.
*3 In her third issue on appeal, Wakefield maintains that the trial court abused its discretion when it
confirmed the report of the sale because it "failed to
sell the entire interests of the parties in the subject
property." A trial court abuses its discretion by acting
arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without consideration of
guiding principles. Walker v. Gutierrez. I l l S.W.3d
56. 62 (Tex.2003).
The agreed order for the sale of the property contained a legal description of the 362.83-acre tract of
land. The agreed order contained no restrictions on
the sale. When the receiver sold the property, he retained, for the parties to the lawsuit, certain mineral
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interests as well as certain royalty interests from future wind turbine contracts. Wakefield claims that, in
making the reservations, the receiver sold the property on terms in direct conflict with the agreed order
of sale.

END OF DOCUMENT

Wakefield cites us to Mergenthaler Linotype Co.
v. McClure. 16 S.W.2d 280 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 19291 for the proposition that a receiver must
follow the mandates of a court order when it sells
property and may not sell on terms that conflict with
the order.
In McClure, the court order contained very detailed instructions on how, when, where, and on what
terms the sale would be made. Among those terms
were that the sale would be for cash and the proceeds
deposited with the court for distribution after a hearing on the establishment of liens and claims against
the property. The holder of the first lien on the property claimed that the receiver refused its bid and that
its bid was higher than the one made by the actual
buyer at the sale. On appeal, the court pointed out
that the first lienholder wanted to credit the amount
of its bid to the lien it held but that "a receiver exercises a naked power according to the mandate of the
court, the terms of which he must follow." McClure.
16S.W.2dat282. The trial court had ordered that the
sale be for cash and that matters involving liens
would be determined later. The receiver was required
to take the action it did and to refuse to authorize the
credit.
Here, the trial court placed no such restrictions
upon the receiver. The order merely provided that the
receiver was to sell the property at private sale. That
was done. The receiver did nothing to conflict with
the order for the sale of the property. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it confirmed the sale
of the property. Wakefield's third issue on appeal is
overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is modified to
show that the owners of the one-third interest credited to the trust are the beneficiaries of the trust. As
modified, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Tex.App.-Eastland,2007.
Wakefield v. Phillips
Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2007 WL 2505634
(Tex.App.-Eastland)
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